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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The collapse or rapid reform of centrally planned regimes throughout 
the world has clearly demonstrated the superiority of a  'market oriented' 
approach to  the  solution of present economic  and  social  problems  in 
comparison with a 'command economy' approach. 
In Europe the breakdown of the USSR and of the Council for Mutual 
Economic  Assistance  (CMEA)  has  also  ended  the  painful division  of 
peoples who  share the  same cultural and historical background.  It has 
opened the way for much greater economic, social and political integration 
for the mutual benefit of European peoples. A first official stage of this 
integration process could be the accession to the European Union (EU-15) 
of six  Central and  Eastern  European  Countries  (CEEC-6), namely  the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. 
As  was  the  case  for  previous  enlargements  of  the  European 
Community, the product price support granted to farmers by the Common 
Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  remains  a  major  economic  and  political 
obstacle to European integration. 
One approach to the accession of CEEC-6 to the EU would be to shift 
most of the  burden of adjustment to the  new entrants.  They  would be 
requested,  as  part of the  acquis  conlnlunautaire,  to  adopt the  present 
Common agricultural price support and to limit the consequent expansion 
in their supply by production quotas, otherwise the EU-25 would face hefty 
export subsidies in contrast with the GAIT commitments. 
Alternatively the burden of structural adjustment could be shared by 
completing the CAP reform for all market regimes and further decoupling 
the  compensatory  payments  granted  to  EU-15  farmers  by  means  of 
redeemable bonds. This choice would be fully compatible with the longer 
term objectives of world-wide reform of agricultural policies repeatedly 
declared in international meetings and subscribed to by the EU. 
A comparative analysis of the likely costs and benefits of these two  . 
alternative strategies has been carried out with reference to the objectives 
of the  CAP spelt out in  Article  39  of the Treaty of Rome.  The most 
important effects on economic efficiency, on the  distribution of income, 
and on the environmental impact of these alternative strategies have been 
described. 
CAP-21.  9-12-94  3 THE 'FORTRESS EUROPE STRATEGY' 
It  is  important  to  recognise  that  if CEEC-6  adopted  a  CAP-like 
policy,  the  CAP-21  would  depend  upon  various  command  economy 
features and its effects on economic efficiency, income distribution, and 
environment would be socially undesirable: 
-output prices would be administered.  They would continue to 
be decided by policymakers  to an  important extent,  not by market 
forces; 
- for  an  increasing  number  of products  (e.g.  sugar,  milk) 
restrictions would be placed on the quantities produced at farm level 
in order to administer the complicated system of public intervention 
applied in these markets; 
-administrative controls would be imposed on the use of arable 
land in order to reduce production. 
These  features  of a  CAP-21  would  constitute  a  kind  of public 
intervention in agriculture more characteristic of a state monopoly than  a 
competitive market. They would result, too, in  all the negative aspects of 
such monopolies: 
-deliberate misuse of available resources (e.g. land set-aside) in 
order to  increase domestic market prices; 
- detailed bureaucratic management; 
- high administrative costs at the Union, national, regional and 
local levels, part of which would be borne by fanners themselves; 
- a  reduction  in  the  entrepreneurial  opportunities  facing 
fanners because their decision-making would be increasingly limited 
by bureaucratic constraints; 
- the frustration of intersectoral and  interregional mobility of 
resources and structural adjustment processes; 
- the capitalisation of production rights in asset values. 
This CAP-21  would worsen the interpersonal distribution of income. 
Moreover, being related to  almost  arbitrary  levels  of price support,  its 
interregional and functional redistributive effects would not be consistent 
with  the  redistribution  carried  out  by  the  EU-21  regional  and  social 
policies and by member-state governments. 
Its net effects on the environment would be negative as price support 
would encourage the use of fertilisers, pesticides and other polluting inputs. 
Dependence  upon  administrative  practices  would  create  larger 
opportunities for fraud, while the  negative impact of domestic protection 
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with third countries. 
Finally,  the  domestic  price  support  and  trade  barriers  of the  21 
member  'Fortress  Europe'  would  systematically  hinder  further 
enlargement of the Union to 27  members early next century, in contrast 
with perspectives recently envisaged in the Essen Summit. 
Given this situation, it  would be hypocritical to suggest to the CEEC-
6, as they seek to introduce a market oriented economy, that they should 
change  from  their previous command economy regimes to a command-
economy-biased  CAP.  This  would  imply  the  very  type  of economic 
inefficiency  and  inequitable  income  distribution from  which  they  were 
seeking to escape. It seems much more honest to admit that a transition to a 
more market oriented economy is needed on both sides of what was the 
iron  curtain,  and  to  set  a  transition  period  and  a  time  horizon  for  a 
convergence towards a genuinely market oriented CAP-21. 
THE'GLOBAL  CONVERGENCE'STRATEGY 
This strategy would not only meet the mutual interests of EU-15 and 
CEEC-6, but  would  be  consistent  with  a  wider  'global convergence' 
towards a freer international market for food  and  agricultural products, 
matching the international cultural and economic responsibilities of the EU-
21.  In brief, it  implies linking agriculture as  an  industry firmly  to  the 
same principles which apply to the rest of the economy.  At the same time 
it enables those social, environmental and regional concerns which have 
played an important part in the development of agricultural policy in both 
the CEEC and the EU countries, to be specifically addressed. 
In  order to  enable  adjustments  and  appropriate  investments  to  be 
adopted in both the CEEC and the EU  countries, it is urgent to take now, 
and  make  known,  the  long-term  decision  to  complete  the  CAP-
15  reform  by: 
- extending  the  present  system  of  partially  decoupled 
compensation to all market regimes by the year 2000; 
- lowering the level of border protection within the EU until it 
represents the same degree of Community preference as is accorded 
to the average of non-agricultural products through the Common 
External Tariff; 
- setting a  time limit (say the year 2010) when all payments 
introduced to compensate EU-15 fanners for the removal of existing 
market price support would be phased out; 
5 - make clear to all  applicants for accession to  the Union that 
these compensatory payments apply only to  EU-15 fanners. They 
will not apply to any new entrant.  Each country will be responsible 
for compensating its  own farmers  if,  as a  result of entry, its own 
price  support  has  to  be  removed.  This  clear  statement  should 
discourage CEECs from being tempted to exploit any leeway, under 
present GATT commitments, to  increase  domestic price support 
assuming  that,  after accession,  compensation  would  be  at  least 
partially funded by the EU budget. 
A  system  of redeemable  bonds should  be  introduced  by  year 
2000 in order to allow farmers to choose whether to capitalise their future 
compensation. A fanner who sold bonds could then decide whether to use 
his lump-sum compensation in order to:-
- stay in fanning in the new competitive market conditions using 
the lump-sum realised by the sale of the bonds to adjust his farm size 
or management in order to lower marginal production costs; 
- use it  in  order to find  a better remunerated job in non-farm 
activities preferably in rural regions. 
A  farmer  who  did  not  sell  his  bond  would,  in  effect,  treat 
compensatory payments as  an addition to current (reduced) revenue from 
farming  and to  pension entitlements.  This  could  represent a  life-long 
strategy allowing him to cope with the problems of retirement. 
Because bonds are  wholly decoupled from  production it would be 
possible  to  recognise  the  differing  impact  on  the  demographic 
characteristics of rural areas,  differences  in  the  regional  levels of real 
income within the EU and the impact of lower prices on the land market. 
In this way when bonds were issued account could be taken of such factors. 
It  will  be  necessary  to  develop  policies  which  ensure  that 
farmers  (or  others)  are appropriately  rewarded  (or  taxed)  for 
any  public  goods  or  positive  (or  negative)  externalities  their 
activities  involve.  Such an approach will take account of the specific 
regional and local character of many of these problems and opportunities, 
by policies mutually  agreed and jointly financed  by Union,  state and 
regional budgets.  It would also require  close integration between the CAP 
and the regional and environmental policies of the EU-21.  In effect this 
would disentangle issues according to the extent to which they needed to be 
handled at a  central or a  regional level, according  to  the principles of 
subsidiarity and in terms of their environmental significance.  The enlarged 
Union  would gain from  both a  more efficient  agriculture  and a  better 
protected environment. 
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In  order  to  promote  progress  and  political  feasibility  towards 
convergence on more market-oriented agricultural policies, the EU-15, and 
more  specifically  the  PHARE programme,  could address  a  number of 
strategic issues in the CEEC-6: 
Improved  trade concessions  in  the  period  before accession 
The  trade  concession  granted by  the  EU  to  the  CEECs  under the 
Europe Agreements should be improved and gradually increased. 
As  the  allocative,  distributive,  and environmental  effects  of tariff 
quotas are likely to be socially undesirable, there would seem a strong case 
for  introducing  straightforward  reductions  in  tariffs  or levies  on  EU 
imports, unlimited by quotas. 
As an interim measure, the coverage of quotas could be increased and 
greater flexibility could be allowed in their use. 
- Unbiased  information 
The  information  available  to  the  general  public  on  the  effects  of 
agricultural  policies  is  very  unsatisfactory.  The  invisible  transfers  of 
income from households to  producers, the losses of social welfare due  to 
the distortion of domestic prices and investments, the positive and negative 
externalities affecting both the natural and the social environment are not 
commonly  perceived  by  the  general  public.  Even  the  funding  of the 
visible transfers made through the budget is unclear to all but the expert. 
The  causes  of this  insufficient  or distorted  information  may  be 
attributed to a lack of balance between bargaining power of vested interests 
and the way this  affects the communication media. A better information 
system could be  created by  improving public  information in  the  media 
directly, and by supporting groups representing wider social interests (e.g. 
consumers, environmentalists) in order to act as a countervailing power in 
the  cultural and political  arena  and  to  contribute  to  a  more  adequate 
understanding of the public interest. 
The  PHARE  could  make  a  great  contribution  to  the  future 
development of agricultural policies in the CEEC-6 by assisting, through a 
'Food  Policy  Network'  (FPN),  public  interest  groups  whose  main 
objectives would be to systematically analyse and monitor the developments 
of food and agricultural policies in each member country. 
Representative  decision  making 
At present decision making on agricultural policies in the EU and in 
CEECs  is  too  heavily  influenced  by  the  private  interests  of farmer 
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most of the burden of the CAP, are only marginally involved and have no 
equivalent pressure group to enable them to operate on equal footing with 
producer  representatives.  The  transfer  of  social,  regional  and 
environmental  aspects  of  the  CAP  to  decision  makers  who  have 
responsibility for these concerns across all industrial sectors, would help to 
correct this tendency. 
Appropriate studies could be sponsored by PHARE, in preparation for 
the  1996 intergovernmental conference  in  order to help the CEECs  to 
devise a more equitable decision-making process.  An outcome along these 
lines would involve a far reaching reform of our political institutions. It 
would make possible the application of the principle that groups should be 
involved in the decision-making institutions in proportion to the social and 
economic  interests  they  have  at  stake.  This  would  help  to  guarantee 
equitable and widely-accepted outcomes.  The  wider application of this 
common sense principle could change the present institutional structure of 
the EU-15 and of CEEC-6 profoundly.  This is an area in which research 
could make a  significant  contribution both  to  the  development of EU 
institutions and to the preparation for enlargement. 
Sectoral  and  local  policy  analyses 
At  this  stage  the  process  of restructuring  CEEC agriculture,  food 
processing  and  distribution  needs  substantial  financial  and  technical 
assistance  from  the  West.  Longer  term  concerns  such  as  improved 
intersectoral  and  intrasectoral  mobility  of resources,  in  particular  of 
labour, should be given more weight. 
In  both the  CEEC-6 and  in  the  new CAP-21,  agricultural policy 
measures must be better targeted, implemented and monitored if they are to 
attain the expected results. Moreover sectoral policies should be consistent 
with overall social welfare objectives at Union, national and local level, 
Interregional  income  transfers  generated  by the  agricultural  price 
support policy are unplanned and often at odds with the normal criteria for 
regional policies which seek to redistribute  income in favour of poorer 
areas.  By targeting and monitoring the economic effects of agricultural 
policy measures, including the structural and cohesion funds,  it  will be 
possible to monitor better the financial and invisible transfers of income as 
they affect each region. As a result, the overall policy of regional income 
redistribution, an important goal for governments, could be better planned, 
monitored and adjusted. 
A proper network of policy analysts would need years to develop in 
the CEEC-6.  Long term assistance by PHARE would be timely and very 
useful. 
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In the CEECs there is a great risk of shifting from state monopolies to 
private monopolies or oligopolies.  Even where firms may not achieve this 
degree of market dominance there is  a danger of imperfect markets. This 
problem is  particularly acute  in  agriculture  where market imperfections 
may materialise at local level in remote regions due to poor communication 
facilities. To minimise such possibilities it  is  essential that intersectoral 
institutional or social barriers to labour mobility are dismantled or reduced 
to a minimum. 
Since competition is  the most characteristic and socially beneficial 
feature of a market  -oriented economy, public intervention should promote 
competitive markets and conditions wherever appropriate. A contribution 
from PHARE to the establishment of an official body entitled to monitor 
factor and product markets and the operation of existing polices could be a 
most effective way of identifying, preventing and, if necessary, dismantling 
any undesired growth of monopolistic or oligopolistic market conditions. 
Centrally  managed  administrative  controls 
Fraud and corruption are among the most readily identified problems 
of state intervention in both the CEECs and in the EU.  Risks increase when 
policies  are  implemented  by  inefficient  or ill-organised  administrative 
structures. In order to  limit the financial losses and a deterioration of the 
ethical environment in rural areas, administrative controls should be better 
managed by the  central EU  administration and  cases of fraud  which are 
detected should be widely publicised. 
PHARE  could  promote  a  comparative  study  of similar  existing 
monitoring organisations at state or Union level in order to devise the best 
structure in the CEEC-6 for so delicate a task. 
Research  and development assistance 
Technological  progress  is  the  main  driving  force  encouraging 
increasing productivity.  This benefits society as a whole provided it is not 
constrained by private interests.  Agricultural problems are often directly 
related to the local soil and climatic conditions, consequently support for an 
extended network of research institutes within the CEECs would help both 
to develop appropriate techniques and to  assist the  transfer of relevant 
aspects of western technology to economies in transition. 
Through  PHARE,  EU-15  research  and  development  assistance  to 
CEEC-6 could be increased and provide a further substantial help to the 
economic development of CEEC-6. 
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Essen summit 
In the Essen European Summit , December 94 , the leaders of the 15 
member countries of the European Union (EU-15) set out the strategies for 
its future enlargement, which could include as many as 27 members early 
next century. The leaders of six associates Central and Eastern European 
Countries  (CEEC-6),  namely  the  four  Visegrad  countries  (the  Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), Bulgaria and Romania were 
invited to the summit and were promised a 'pre-accession strategy in the 
following  spring,  setting  out  the  steps  they  must  take  for  future 
membership. 
Hungary and the Czech Republic have already set themselves a five-
year timetable  for joining the  European  Union  as  front-runners  of the 
CEEC-6, while further enlargement to  the East could include the Baltic 
states  and  Slovenia  after  they  conclude  negotiations  for  associate 
membership in  1995. 
Among Mediterranean countries only Malta and Cyprus are preparing 
for  accession,  however EU  leaders  showed  their commitment  to  their 
southern neighbours by blessing a plan to  embrace north Africa and the 
Middle East in a free-trade zone. The EU's ultimate ambition is to create a 
Euro-Mediterranean Economic area.I 
However all major decisions on enlargement will be taken after the 
1996  intergovernmental  conference  which  will  review  the  Maastricht 
Treaty. 
EU enlargement needs CAP refmm 
In his speech Mr Delors made clear that the EU would have to reform 
its own policies to cope with eastern enlargement, including reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
One peculiar characteristic of the CAP has been the wide recognition 
of the need of its reform on the ground of domestic economic reasons at all 
technical levels: experts, academics, and in the EU Commission. However, 
in practice, external pressures have always been very important. The far-
reaching  1992 MacSharry reform  was  largely the  result of international 
constraints which emerged in the GATT negotiations, but still needs to be 
completed for a  number of commodities such as  sugar, wine, fruit  and 
vegetables. 
1 Financial Times 12-12-1994, p. 2 
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crucial moment of change in  the  CAP and  could either delay the reform 
process or speed it up. 
Two main strategies 
As far as agricultural policy is concerned, the fundamental alternative 
approaches to EU enlargement  could be summarised as follows. 
- A strategy leading to a CEEC-6 accession to the present CAP by 
accepting  the  'acquis  conzmunautaire'  as  was the case in the previous 
enlargements of the EU.  This option would shift most of the adjustment 
burden to the CEEC-6 and delay the completion of the reform process in 
the EU-15. 
- A  strategy leading to  CEEC-6 accession to  a CAP-15  which has 
completed the ongoing reform according to the principles stated by Article 
39 of the Treaty of Rome and to the  EU  declarations  of intent made in 
international fora.  This  option  would  need  a  reciprocal adjustment  and 
convergence towards a global situation of increased free trade, according to 
the GA Tf  long term objectives. 
These  two  strategies  will  be  analysed  in  a  systematic  way  by 
highlighting their respective costs and benefits for farmers and for society 
as a whole, both in the EU and in the CEECs. 
Plan of  the work 
First reference will be made to the objectives, set out in the Treaty of 
Rome for sectoral policies and, in particular, for the CAP  (§  1  ).  Then two 
extreme paradigms of a 'command economy' approach and of 'minimal 
state  intervention'  will  be  outlined  in  order to  set  the  wider scope  of 
possible strategies (§  2), 
Two major feasible strategies, defined as:  'Fortress Europe'  (§  3) and 
'Global Convergence' (§  4) will then be described in terms of their goals 
and of the policy instruments which could be used. 
A comparative analysis of the likely effects of these two strategies on 
economic efficiency,  income  distribution,  and  on the  environment  of 
CEECs prior to accession and the EU-21  will be  outlined, followed by an 
overall appraisal. 
The  results  of  this  analysis  will  then  be  used  to  provide 
recommendations (§  5) to  the activity of the PHARE programme  in the 
Central and Eastern European Countries. 
2.  OBJECTIVES AND  ANALYTICAL  APPROACH 
Private vs. public 
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trade-off between the welfare of the people directly involved in the specific 
sector of production and  the welfare of society as  a whole. Some policy 
measures improve the sector's welfare as  well as  the 'social' welfare, and 
obviously these measures do not create problems. 
In contrast,  some  other policy measures  transfer resources  among 
social groups, or produce a benefit for some people or social groups at a 
much larger cost for the rest of society. In this case economic as well as 
political and ethical problems arise for the policy maker. 
2.1.  OBJECTIVES OF SECTORAL POLICIES 
Private objectives vs. public objectives 
We usually assume that private entrepreneurs pursue their personal 
interest  when  maximising  profit  in  the  production  process,  and  that 
· consumers  seek to  maximise  their utility  when  operating in  the  market 
place.  These  types  of economic  behaviour are  at  the  base  of market-
oriented economies. 
In contrast, when dealing with economic policy, we  usually assume 
that policy makers aim  at  the  interest of society as  a whole, and seek to 
prevent possible abuses resulting from the private behaviour of individuals. 
Economic policies in  particular  are  supposed to  aim at increasing social 
welfare by preventing the formation of monopolies and oligopolies, as well 
as  by  fostering  economic efficiency,  improving  interpersonal  income 
distribution, providing public goods,  reducing negative externalities and 
favouring positive externalities generated by private firms or individuals. 
Aristotle & philosophers  on  social welfare 
The  concept  that  the  policy  maker's  behaviour  should  aim  at 
maximising the 'common good' when in conflict with the 'private interest' 
is  as  old as western civilisation.  In  the fourth century BC.  Aristotle was 
already  classifying  governments  in  two  categories,  according  to  their 
attainment  of  the  common  good.I  Forms  of government  aiming  at 
increasing the welfare of society as  a whole were classified as  'perfect', 
while  governments  aiming  at  private  interests  of individuals  or social 
groups  were  classified  as  'degenerate'.  Monarchy  for  example  may 
degenerate into tyranny if it is  pursuing the personal interest of the king, 
aristocracy may degenerate in oligarchy if pursuing the personal interest of 
the few people ruling the  country, even democracy may degenerate if it 
pursues only the private interests of poorest people to the damage of the 
whole society. 
I Aristotle p. 207. 
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most influential philosophers  1 and religious leaders2 in  western countries 
have  argued  that  giving  equal weight  to  other peoples'  interests  is  a 
fundamental characteristic of moral behaviour for individuals. A fortiori 
the policy maker, in attaining the highest social welfare, is expected to give 
the same weight to  all individuals, without  discrimination.  Actually in 
numerous countries, when ministers take office, they must take an oath that 
they will pursue only the supreme interests of the nation and not private 
interests of any type.  3 
Main aspects of  social welfare 
In order to assess the effects of sectoral policies on social welfare, 
three main features may be examined more in detail: 
- the 'effects  on  efficiency'  which can be appraised by analysing 
the  technical and economic costs and benefits of policy measures in the 
short run and in the long run, consequent to their impact on the investment 
structure; 
..  the 'effects on equity', broadly  appraise~ in relation to the ways in 
which  sector  policy  measures  modify  the  intersectoral,  interregional 
interpersonal and functional distribution of income. 
- the  'effects  on  the  environment'  appraised  in  terms  of the 
impact of sectoral policy measures on positive and negative externalities 
affecting the natural environment, and on the production of public goods. 
2.2.  OBJECTIVES OF THE CAP 
Efficiency and equity inter-related in art. 39 
These three aspects of social welfare are reflected in the well known 
Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome: 
The common agricultural policy shall have as its objectives: 
1  .  " ...  even  if most people's preferences  are  not completely  selfish,  they  are 
particularistic in the sense of giving more weight  to their own interests and to those of their 
family members and friends than to those of other people. In contrast, our moral value 
judgements are, or at least are expected to be, universalistic  in the sense of impartially 
giving the same weight  to everybody's interests. This fact can be expressed also by saying 
that our moral value judgements are guided by our moral preferences, defined as the 
preferences we would have if we made a special effort to look at social situations from an 
impersonal and impartial point of view. Already Adam Smith pointed out that the moral 
point of view is basically that of a sympathetic  but impartial  observer." Harsanyi 1991 p. 
184-5. 
2 In the Old Testament it was stated 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself' 
(Leviticus 19, 18). This same principle was then qualified by Jesus Christ as one of the two 
commandments on which depend the whole Law and the Prophets. (Matthew  22, 39) 
3 See Tarditi (1992 and 1994a) 
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ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum 
utilisation of the factors of production , particularly labour; 
b)  to  ensure thereby  a  fair  standard  of living for the  agricultural  population, 
particularly by  the increasing of the individual earnings of persons engaged in 
agriculture; 
c) to stabilise markets; 
d) to guarantee regular supplies; and 
e) to ensure reasonable prices in supplies to consumers. 
The  improvement of efficiency in the use of resources, which in the 
longer term  may be expressed as  the  attainment  of the  higher rate  of 
sustainable economic development,  is  stated  in  clause  39a and makes 
specific reference to the optimal allocation of labour. The concern for the 
stability of markets and of the economy as a whole, which is very crucial 
for  the  attainment of economic efficiency,  especially  in  agriculture,  is 
covered in clauses '39c' and '39d'. 
The improvement of equity, is referred to in clause '39b' with special 
reference to the  'individual earning of persons engaged in agriculture'. A 
wider concern for an improved  income  distribution within the  whole 
society is implied in clause '39e' by ensuring reasonable prices in supplies 
to consumers. 
It  is  worth noting that clauses  '39a' and  '39b' are  not  mentioned 
independently. The attainment of the redistributive objective in clause 'b' is 
made dependent upon the attainment of the efficiency objective in  clause 
'39a' by the  conjunction 'thereby'  .1  In other words the  'fair standard of 
living for the agricultural population' should be attained by increasing the 
productivity of the economic system, and a better allocation of resources, 
not  independently via  income  transfers  conveyed  from  the  rest  of the 
economy to the agricultural sector. 
Environmental concerns 
In 1957, when the objectives of the CAP were stated, environmental 
problems were probably smaller and not perceived by EU citizens in the 
way they are now. However the European Commission and the EU Council 
on a  number of occasions have  stated their concern for  improving the 
environment. The new Treaty on European Union, signed by all Member 
States on 7  February  1992, has  introduced as  a  principal objective the 
promotion of sustainable growth respecting the environment (Art.  2).  It 
includes among the activities of the Union a policy in the sphere of the 
environment (Art. 3 (k)  ), specifies that this policy must aim at a high level 
of protection  and  that  environmental  protection  requirements  must be 
1 This aspect is often overlooked in the literature, see for example 'Agra Europe CAP 
monitor' Ch 1,  §  1.2, European Commission DG-11  (1994) p.5, or Felton-Taylor et al. 
(1994) p.3 
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policies (Art.  130r(2))I 
Consequently  the  environmental  impact  of envisaged  policy 
measures  should  be  considered  as  well,  as  it  has  become  one  of the 
fundamental concerns of CAP measures in rural areas. 
3.  TWO REFERENCE PARADIGMS 
In order to envisage more clearly the alternative strategies discussed in 
the following pages, it  may be useful to outline the main features of two 
extreme paradigms.  These represent benchmarks between which lie the 
feasible strategies of agricultural policy. 
3.1.  THE 'COMMAND ECONOMY' 
Description 
The  command  economy  prevailed  in  the  last  four  decades  in 
CEECs and in  the  Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the 
previous economic integration scheme of CEECs with the Soviet Union.  A 
brief analysis of this approach is  useful in  order to  construct scenarios of 
possible strategies and in order to better understand the transition problems 
facing CEECs. In the light of experience there is no possibility of such an 
extreme  policy  being  implemented  now,  notwithstanding  the  recent 
electoral success of socialist  -oriented  parties  in  some  CEECs  who  are 
rather more interested in a socially conscious market economy. 
According to  the  Marxist-Leninist  theories  the command economy 
should have been able to control the economic forces which destabilise the 
capitalistic  regimes  and  to  attain  the  maximum  social  welfare.  The 
expropriation  of private  property  of land  and  capital  assets  and  the 
centralised decisions on  'what, how  and for  whom' goods are produced 
should have allowed complete mastery of the economy, the full exploitation 
of scale economies, the best envisaged income distribution, and the direct 
control of positive and negative externalities by the policymaker. 
Effects on efficiency 
The effects  on  efficiency  have  proved  disastrous.  The  plans  of 
policymakers and a huge bureaucratic apparatus have shown to be much 
less effective in managing national economies than a decentralised decision 
making process based on  individual initiative and private ownership of 
capital goods. Prices were stable, but set at arbitrary levels, and the official 
full employment was disguising a huge underemployment and unnecessary 
labour intensive  techniques.  The  economy  was  concealing  a  profound 
1 Commission of the EC 1993, Towards Sustainability, p.37 
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bankruptcy. 
These shortcomings of the centrally planned regimes were even more 
apparent in agriculture, where the decentralised decision making role of the 
farmer is essential in managing a production process which is  particularly 
uncertain.  To a unique extent farming is dependent upon the vagaries of 
weather conditions, crop and  animal  diseases,  and on all the problems 
related to crop and livestock biological processes. 
Applying  some of the  characteristics of the command economy in 
CAP-21 would prevent especially the attainment of the  'optimal utilisation 
of factors of production' mentioned in Article '39a'. 
Effects on equity 
The  actual  distribution  of  income  produced  under  command 
economies  was  tightly  controlled.  In financial  terms,  the  differences 
among wage levels were much smaller than those existing in  the market 
economies.  However real income differentials were substantially higher 
due  to  the  privileges  and  non-monetary  benefits  enjoyed  by the  more 
powerful bureaucrats and by some members of the communist party. 
It is  questionable if this income distribution were more equitable, i.e. 
related both to the  merits and needs of the people, than the  distribution 
existing in some  western democracies. Anyway, the low levels of income 
in absolute terms dramatically reduced the positive effects on social welfare 
of a  possibly  better income  distribution.  One  result  of the  failure  to 
allocate farm resources  in a more productive manner was that the standard 
of living for the agricultural population remained quite low. 
Effects on environment 
The effects on  the environment have  been  notoriously  negative. 
The policy maker's concern for the maximisation of social welfare, which 
in theory should have been strengthened by the centrally planned regimes, 
especially in  relation  to  the  protection of non-marketed environmental 
goods, has been in practice lower than in market economies. 
In a social environment where people were frustrated by lack of civil 
freedom,  constraints  on  entrepreneurial  decisions  and  on  personal, 
territorial and social mobility,  individual concern for the well-being of 
society as a whole did not develop. The lack of competition among firms 
and the overwhelming bureaucratic practices generated diffused frauds and 
hypocritical behaviour, diminishing social welfare. 
3.2.  THE 'MINIMAL STATE  INTERVENTION' PARADIGM 
Description 
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internal and international trade.  State intervention in the domestic market 
would be  limited as far as possible, to the correction of market failures. 
This  might  include  stabilising  markets,  actions  to  limit  negative 
externalities, promote positive externalities and  the production of public 
goods.  Where thought necessary for the stability of the economy, it might 
also provide for a  moderate  redistribution  of income  in  favour of the 
worst  -off people. 
In full  contrast with  the  command economy, this  approach had a 
certain appeal to CEEC policymakers immediately after the abandonment 
of the  centralised socialist regimes,  and  inspired  some early economic 
reforms  in  the transition period.  Its  immediate effects on economic and 
social  life  were  not  very  satisfactory  and  this  paradigm  too  has  no 
substantial probability of being accepted as such by any of the CEECs. 
Effects on efficiency 
In  principle  the  effects  on  efficiency  would  be  very  positive. 
Market forces would play freely and domestic prices would tend to indicate 
the  marginal  benefit  of goods  to  consumers  and  the  marginal  cost  to 
producers.  In  practice,  without  state  intervention  and  given the  global 
nature  of some  agricultural  markets,  monopolistic  and  oligopolistic 
situations could arise  for  some  products,  impairing resource allocation. 
Further,  there  is  a  need  for  governments  to  ensure  that  externalities, 
associated with production are taken into account if a fully efficient system 
is to be created. In the short run a number of regional economic equilibria 
would  be  disrupted,  creating  substantial  economic  and  environmental 
adjustment problems. 
The domestic market would be fully dependent on the world market. 
Although world market fluctuations  would be lower than at present, EU 
domestic  prices  would be  much more  variable.  On the whole, the  CAP 
objective of a 'rational development of agricultural production' would not 
be fully attained. 
Effects on equity 
The  distribution  of  income  would  change  considerably.  At 
intersectoral level, for example, in the EU-15  the removal of support to 
fanning  would  dramatically  change  the  standard  of  living  of  the 
agricultural population. In some member states present transfers to· the 
fanning sector generated by agricultural policies are actually larger than its 
value added.  The interregional distribution of income  would be most 
strongly affected in  less developed areas where agriculture still plays a 
leading economic role and where a large share of the population is rural. 
Especially in Southern European regions, where the share of farmers 
in total employment is  still  very  high,  a  substantial reduction  in farm 
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This would be likely to create acute social problems which would be very 
unwelcome to policymakers. 
On the whole, the present support of agricultural incomes in CEECs is 
still  relatively modest.  As  a  result,  such  a  strategy  would  have  less 
dramatic effects on  income distribution, although operating in the  same 
direction as indicated for the EU-15. 
Effects on environment 
The effects  on  natural environment would  be  mixed.  Reduced 
intensity  in  input  use  would  ease  problems  of pollution.  In contrast, 
changed fanning practices might result in a deterioration in the aesthetic 
values  of the  landscape.  In  some  regions  the  present  landscape  is  an 
important economic resource as tourist attraction and as  a public good for 
rural  population.  The  overall  loss  in  terms  of social  welfare  could be 
. substantial. 
The worst effects of a lack of public intervention would be on rural 
communities. In the EU a number of less favoured areas, where agriculture 
remains  the  main  economic  activity,  would  face  a  collapse  of their 
economic and social fabric and a severe risk of depopulation. 
Although in agriculture  economies  of scale are relatively small, in 
some regions there would be a risk of excessive concentration of land in 
few  hands.  This  could  generate  additional  demographic  and  social 
problems, as well as change the present rural landscape. 
4.  THE 'FORTRESS EUROPE' STRATEGY 
Between these two extreme paradigms stand the  agricultural policies 
actually implemented, ranging from substantial government intervention in 
the agro-food economy, as  in Japan, to  a very limited public intervention, 
as in New Zealand. 
Art. 40, protection allowed 
Although the Treaty of Rome is generally committed to free trade and 
competition,  clause  3  of Article  40  gives  the  EU  policymakers  the 
possibility to attain the objectives of the CAP through means that are not 
fully consistent with free trade: "the common organisation  ... may include all 
measures required to attain the objectives set out in Article 39, in particular 
regulation of prices, aids for the production and marketing of the various 
products, storage and carryover arrangements and common machinery for 
stabilising imports or exports". 
This opportunity to use protectionist polices was exploited at the first 
setting of common prices and market organisations in  1963. The domestic 
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prices and higher even than the average level of support previously existing 
in  the  six  member  countries  founding  the  CAP.  This  price  support 
generated a substantial transfer of income from domestic consumers to the 
farming  sector by  setting  trade  barriers  at  the  border of the  European 
Community, in order to protect domestic producers from the competition 
of cheap products exported by third countries. 
4.1.  GOALS 
Early justification of  CAP support 
With  reference  to  the  objectives  of the  CAP,  price  support  of 
agricultural products could find a justification in the early sixties for the 
EC-6 in terms of "guaranteeing regular supplies" to consumers. As the EC-
6 was a net importer of basic agricultural products, the public good of a 
minimal level  of self sufficiency could be  accepted as  a motivation for 
increasing social welfare. 
However, by supporting domestic market prices, the domestic demand 
was  reduced  and  domestic  supply  expanded,  rapidly  leading to  surplus 
production which had to be disposed of on the world market by subsidising 
exports.  Soon  the  EC  had  no  self-sufficiency  problems  in  temperate 
products.  On the contrary its problem was of food  surpluses. Further the 
traditional motivation  for  a  minimal  degree  of food  self-sufficiency  in 
order to face possible wars or economic blockades, was much less urgent. 
In  the  present  climate  of global  economic  integration,  following  the 
collapse of ideologically opposed communist regimes all over in the world, 
there is even less fear of such disruption. I 
Support of  farm incomes 
It became impossible to justify increasing export subsidies in terms of 
the CAP objective to ensure food security. The main justification was then 
found in the concept of 'support and guarantee of farmers incomes'.  This 
is  still the main justification for policies leading directly or indirectly to 
price support.  Actually in  the  in EU the demand of agricultural products 
increases slowly, at an annual rate of about 0.5% in the last decades, due to 
the low income elasticity of food consumption and to the very low rates of 
demographic  growth.  On the  other hand,  in  recent  decades  due  to  the 
impact of new technologies and high support prices, supply has expanded 
rapidly, at an annual rate of about 2%.  As  a consequence market prices 
and farm revenues  tend to fall leading to a worsening of the standard of 
living of farmers and creating poverty and social problems in rural areas. 
I  However many European countries depend heavily (up  to  80%) on imports of 
energy. In case of war or economic blocade this would be the immediate cause of their 
political collapse, not a lack of food self-sufficiency. 
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The 'Fortress Europe' strategy is based on the assumption, that  this 
negative trend in market prices should be resisted by the policy maker who 
must prevent farm incomes falling to undesirable levels, or at least support 
them to  a certain extent, in  order to  'ensure .... a fair standard of living 
for the  agricultural population' as  stated in  clause 39b of the Treaty of 
Rome. 
Policymakers adopting this  strategy are  mainly concerned with the 
interests of the agricultural sector and with maintaining the  status quo in 
order to prevent costly adjustments in the fann structure. 
This  attitude  is  frequent  on  the  part of farm  organisations  and  is 
explicitly stated in some documents of EU member countries.  I 
Often  the  wish  to  resist  the  trend  towards  a  reduction  in  farm 
employment is  explicitly stated. In practice a large agricultural population 
provides  a  secure  electoral  base  for  supporting  farm  interests  in  the 
political arena. 
As  with  previous  enlargements  of  the  European  Community, 
according  to  this  strategy  new  entrants  must  accept  the  'a c qui  s 
con2.n1.unautaire'  and introduce in their domestic market the Community 
price support system, gradually adjusting their production structures to the 
new economic conditions in the Common Market. 
4.2.  INSTRUMENTS 
Border protection, eJ.port subsidies, quotas 
The instruments preferred by this strategy are  the traditional devices 
of price support as applied by the CAP.  At first they consisted in a border 
protection against imports, then export subsidies were introduced in order 
to dispose of domestic surpluses. In the eighties, as a result of international 
pressures from trade partners, the unwelcome external effects of domestic 
1 For example the Italian National Agricultural Plan lists as first objective "the 
support and development of agricultural incomes" (Tarditi, 1992, p.60) 
Sometimes the preference given to private interests as opposed to social interests is 
implicitly assumed. As an example, the recent (8 September 1994) French Memorandum 
"Pour une agriculture europeenne ambitieuse" states that "it is necessary to reconsider the 
level of  relative support granted to each production in order to maintain its competitiveness" 
(Republique  Fran~aise, 1994, p.  7). Apparently the document makes reference to the 
'private' competitiveness of producers or exporters which is enhanced by  government 
subsidies or other types of support. If we look at it from the point of view of society as a 
whole, taking into account the cost of support born by non-agricultural people, in most 
cases public support is reducing social welfare and hindering adjustment, consequently 
lowering the capacity of  producers to compete in fair terms  at international level. 
From this point of view  the fact that "France privileges the maintenance of the export 
vocation of the  Community" (page 2)  may  be  considered  ambitious by  the French 
government but perhaps not in the best interests of the whole people of the Union. 
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constrained milk  output  by  means  of production quotas  and,  later on, 
limited the production of cereals by means of land set-aside  Although the 
rising cost of the budget was also a cause of concern, the immediate effect 
of these changes was to increase rather than to reduce expenditure on farm 
support. 
Product specific 
As applied in the EU, price support, output quotas and land set  -aside, 
all relate to specific products.  They protect EU producers in proportion to 
their marketed output.  This has been the most important way of supporting 
all farm incomes, without discrimination relating to the economic or social 
characteristics of the rural area, of farm structure, or of the environmental 
externalities produced by agriculture. 
Under GAIT reduction commitments 
These policy measures  generate trade distortions and involve transfers 
from  consumers  which  are  non  transparent  as  people  at  large  do  not 
perceive how much market prices have been increased by the CAP.  Under 
commitments  in  the  1994  GATT agreement  signed  in  Marrakesh price 
support measures will have to be reduced. 
In the next six years, the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) will 
be reduced  by  20%  over the  base  period  (1986-88),  and  all  non-tariff 
measures  used  for  border protection such  as  variable  import levies  and 
quotas will be 'tariffied', i.e. expressed in tariff equivalents. 
Export subsidies will be reduced in value by 36 % and the volume of 
subsidised exports, by 21  % over a six year period from a base period set 
as the average level in 1986-90 . 
Objective method 
In order to guarantee farm incomes, price support must be kept above 
the cost of production. In the sixties an ingenious 'objective method' was 
devised to compute at what level prices should have been raised in relation 
to the increased level of production costs. 
This approach (a) took into consideration only the interest of farmers, 
not the market conditions, (b)  could not be  properly targeted,  as farms 
have very different cost structures according to their size and technology, 
(c) implicitly hindered structural adjustment, as  output prices depended 
upon production costs and not vice-versa. 
Ultimately this approach was abandoned, but the underlying political 
thinking is embodied in the concept that fann incomes should be guaranteed 
per se, without too much concern with the rest of the economy. 
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Nallet and Von Stolk propose a EU-21  with a two-level price support 
for the EU-15 and the CEEC-6. New entrants would have a lower level of 
price support reflecting their production costs, i.e.  based on an updated, 
partial version of the  'objective method' previously mentioned.  A system 
of levies and refunds would be  set between EU-15 and CEEC-6. The net 
budgetary gain from  this  intra EU-21  trade  would be spent in financial 
assistance to CEECs. 
If it could be  implemented, this proposal would substantially reduce 
the  budgetary  costs  of accession,  without  involving  further  CAP-15 
reform. However, as mentioned by the authors,  it is probably inconsistent 
with the  1986 Single European Act, since there would not be a European 
common market for agricultural products. Moreover, the recent inerease in 
protection and  in  price support  in  CEECs  indicates that such a  scheme 
would be rapidly seized upon by farmers lobbies as a basis for demanding 
higher levels of domestic price support approximating the EU -15 level. 
Although  advanced as  a 'stabilisation' plan, the  document does not 
distinguish measures of stabilisation and support.  This has been typical of 
the CAP, where price stabilisation has almost always been managed at a 
level of price support considerably above that needed to stabilise prices at 
their long term free-market  trend.  CEEC farmers  would  rightly  claim 
equal treatment in terms of 'stabilisation-support' to that accorded to EU-
15  farmers.  This is  fully  recognised in  the  documents expression: "It is 
high time to propose that CEEC farmers embark on the path that will lead 
them progressively towards their fellow farmers in the West"  .1 
In the 'Fortress Europe' approach we  assume that in  the EU-21  the 
level of price support agreed under the GATT agreement is maintained via 
border protection, output quotas or land set-aside as  appropriate for each 
market regime  as  implemented at  present. In  economic terms the  EU  is 
behaving as a fortress, not only defending its domestic agricultural market 
from external competition but acting against world markets dumping its 
surpluses by subsidising exports. 
4.2.1.  The  'Fortress Europe' Strategy  in  the  CEECs 
CAP-like policies 
Agriculture is generally considered to be the sector in which potential 
new EU members have to introduce most fundamental change and the case 
of the CEEC's represents no exception. In the intent of harmonising their 
agriculture with the CAP, many of these countries have been introducing 
I  Nallet, Van Stolk (1994) p. 21 
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have been introduced by Poland, the  Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary 
and Estonia. 
Table 4.2-1  Basic data 
Demographic growth rate  Population  GNPpc  1 Ext. debt 1 
1970/  1980/  1992/  (m)  (US$)  (%GNP) 
1980  1992  2000  1992  2000  1992  1992 
Romania  0.9  0.2  0  22.7  23  1130  14 
Bulgaria  0.4  -0.3  -0.4  8.5  8  1330  124.5 
Poland  0.9  0.6  0.2  38.4  39  1910  55.2 
Slovak R.  0.9  0.5  0.6  5.3  6  1930 
Czech R.  0.5  0.1  0.2  10.3  11  2450 
Hungary  0.4  -0.3  -0.4  10.3  10  2970  65 
Source: World Development Report. Handbook of mtemahonal trade and development statistics (U.N.). 
World Population Prospections (World Bank). OECD (1994b). 
Introducing CAP-like measures in the interests of harmonisation also 
runs into difficulties because the CAP represents a moving target, and when 
the CEECs enter the EU they are likely to find  a very different CAP. This 
is  due not only to  the  MacSharry Reform of 1992 and  the  1993  GATT 
agreement, but also because the Delors II financial perspective for the EU 
Budget until 1999 sets a limit on the growth of agricultural spending, and 
further  reform  of the  CAP  is  likely  to  prove necessary  to  enable  this 
guideline to be  respected. The Single Market, the Maastricht Programme, 
and the  accession of the EFT  A countries will  also reduce the weight of 
agriculture in an enlarged EU. 
CEEC share of  agricultural production 
Table 4.2-2 illustrates the  CEEC share in  agricultural production of 
the  combined total of EU,  EFTA  and CEEC states  in  1992. The CEEC 
share is  substantial for certain products, accounting for 23% of cereals, 
29% of pigs, 17% of cattle and 18% of sheep. 
Table 4.2-2 CEEC share of production of various products in the enlarged EU total (1992)* 
(cro  roduction in 1000 tonnes, and livestock in 1000s) 
B  garia  3%  1%  1%  2%  1% 
Czechoslovakia  4%  3%  4%  2%  4o/o 
Hungary  4%  1%  5%  3%  1% 
Poland  8%  28%  9%  7%  7% 
Romania  5%  3%  1%  5%  4% 
Total CEEC  23%  37%  20%  19%  17%  29%  18% 
he statistics are  or 1992 and  or  e enlarged EU they include the present EU members, 
the EFT' A countries and the CEECs.  Totals may not add due to rounding. 
Source FAO Yearbook 1992 and House of Lords (1994b) 
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An indication of the level of support for various agricultural products 
in  the EU can be given by their PSE, or producer subsidy equivalentsl. 
Table 3.1-2 below sets out PSE estimates for the EU, Poland and Hungary 
in  1992.  Market price  support accounted  for  91%  of the  assistance  to 
farmers taken into account in calculating PSEs for Hungary and 87% in the 
case of the EU in 1992. For most products a comparison of PSEs between 
these countries therefore essentially reflects differences in  levels of price 
support. 
Table 4.2-3 A comparison of percentage* PSE's for the European Community, Hungary 
and Poland in 1992 
European  Hungary  Poland 
Communi!Y_ 
wheat  52  4  9 
.  coarse grains  58  -3  -2 
oil seeds  65  -35  22# 
white sugar  73  56  20 
milk  67  33  6 
beef and veal  58  26  -31 
pigmeat  8  -7  17 
poultry  11  14  10 
sheepmeat  71  -20  12 
eggs  -11  37  19 
All commodities  47  8  16 
PSE  expressed  as  a  %  of the  value  of total  output 
In  the  case  of  livestock  products  net  percentage  PSEs  (which  include  a  feed 
adjustment)  have  been  used 
#  rapeseed 
Source:  OECD,  ( 1994a);  Yearbook  of the  Polish  Central  Statistical  Office 
The PSE estimates set out in Table 4.2-3 were for 1992 (more recent 
data  was  not  available  for  Hungary  and  Poland),  so  indicate  the  EU 
situation before the MacSharry Reform came into operation. According to 
the OECD, the  PSE for all  EU  products increased slightly from 47% in 
1992 to  48%  in  1993, but the  share of market price support in total EU 
assistance to farmers fell from 87% to 83% over the same period. 
The most highly subsidised EU product (as measured by total PSE) in 
1993 was milk (with 20,155 million ECU) followed by beef with 16,347 
million ECU.  In percentage terms  sugar was  in first  position with 67% 
followed by oilseeds (63%), coarse grains (62%), milk (61 %), beef (60%), 
sheepmeat (58%)  and  wheat  (57%).  This  meant that for certain of the 
products most affected by the MacSharry Reform (wheat and coarse grains) 
1 These can be defmed as the subsidy necessary to replace all the agricultural which a 
country adopts and leaving farm revenue unchanged. 
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products (sugar, oilseeds, milk and sheepmeat) there was a decline. 
According to the OECD estimates, Hungary's PSE for all products has 
fallen rapidly from 45% in  1986 to 8% in 1992 bringing Hungary on a par 
with countries such as New Zealand and Australia which are low supporters 
of agriculture. The Polish PSE fell from 24% in 1988 to -3% in 1989 and 
-33% in 1990. Subsequently it increased to 0 in 1991  and 16% in 1992, but 
remains  low  in comparison with the EU,  US  or Japan.  However, these 
statistics should be treated with caution given the difficulty of estimating 
PSEs  in  economies  in  transition  1  in  particular because  prior to  the 
introduction  of convertibility  the  use  of different  exchange  rates  in 
calculations leads to different results2. 
As Table 4.2-3  shows, the greatest differences between the EU and 
Hungary are for oilseeds, sheepmeat, coarse grains, and wheat. Hungarian 
PSEs were higher than those of the  EU  only in the case of poultry and 
eggs, while Polish PSEs were higher only for eggs and pigmeat, with the 
poultry PSE almost the same as that of the EU: In the case of Poland the 
greatest differences in declining order were for beef and veal, milk, coarse 
grains, sugar, sheepmeat, wheat and oilseeds. Extension of the present CAP 
to  these  countries  would  therefore  involve  substantial  increases  in 
government support for most products. 
Situation in Poland 
In 1994 Poland also introduced a quota on sugar production similar to 
that operating in  the EU. The Polish system consists of an overall quota 
divided into a quota to supply the domestic market and a quota for exports, 
backed if necessary by government subsidies.  The system  involves  the 
concentration of existing state-owned sugar refineries  into four regional 
holding companies.  These  are  to  be under the  control of a joint stock 
holding company run by  the Treasury, though eventually up to 40% of 
shares will be privatised. The continuing monopoly position of state-owned 
firms  raises  doubts about whether there  will  be  sufficient incentives to 
adjustment and improvements in quality. 
The debate  about  whether or how much agricultural protection to 
introduce in a transition economy was particularly explicit in the case of 
Poland.  During  1990  Poland  introduced  a  very  liberal  trade  policy, 
1 see also Tangennann (1993) 
2 The PSE estimates here are calculated at official exchange rates. In the case of 
Poland, the PSEs at market PLZIUS $exchange rate were generally lower: 22 in 1988,-29 
in 1989, -32 in 1990, -43 in 1991, and -17 in 1992 (Agra Europe, East Europe Agriculture 
and Food Monthly, March 1994). 
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was compounded by the unintended consequences of the combination of a 
fixed nominal exchange rate and higher than expected inflation. In 1991 
this  policy  was  modified  and  relatively  high  customs  duties  were 
introduced,  in  particular for  many  agricultural products.  From August 
1991  duties on imports of live animals, and meat ranged from 10-35%, on 
dairy products from  35-40% and  on  many processed products from  30-
50%. From 1992 import licensing was introduced for dairy products. 
Polish protectionist lobbies 
The introduction of such measures  owes  much to  the Polish farm 
lobby. Moreover justification could be  found  in  the rather controversial 
proposal of the Polish/EC/World Bank Study (1990), which suggested that 
the Polish government should use  "all types of border measures including 
quantitative restrictions", as well as a system of import taxes and subsidies 
to support the domestic prices of cereals. 
The argument in  favour of agricultural protectionism  was that  it  is 
practised by everyone else, and that a single country could not place itself 
at a disadvantage vis a' vis other agricultural exporters such as the EU. The 
surge  in  imports  and  the  rapid  decline  in  domestic  production  were 
advanced as  evidence of the  vulnerability of Polish farming.  Infant and 
senescent industry arguments were also drawn on in favour of protection. 
4.3.  EFFECTS ON  EFFICIENCY 
4.3.1.  In  the agricultural  sector 
Mo1wpolistic features 
It  is  important  to  recognise  that  if CEEC-6  adopted  a  CAP-like 
policy,  the  CAP-21  would  depend  upon  various  command  economy 
features  and  its  effects  on  economic  efficiency  would  be  socially 
undesirable: 
-output prices would be administered.  They would continue to 
be decided by policymakers  to an important extent,  not by market 
forces; 
- for  an  increasing  number of products  (e.g.  sugar,  milk) 
restrictions would be placed on the quantities produced at farm  l~vel 
in order to administer the complicated system of public intervention 
applied in these markets; 
-administrative controls would be imposed on the use of arable 
land in order to reduce production. 
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intervention in agriculture more characteristic of a state monopoly  t  than  a 
competitive market. They would result, too, in  all the negative aspects of 
such monopolies: 
-deliberate misuse of available resources (e.g. land set-aside) in 
order to increase domestic market prices; 
- detailed bureaucratic management; 
- high administrative costs at the Union, national, regional and 
local levels, part of which would be borne by farmers themselves; 
- a  reduction  in  the  entrepreneurial  opportunities  facing 
farmers because their decision-making would be increasingly limited 
by bureaucratic constraints; 
- the frustration of intersectoral and interregional mobility of 
resources and structural adjustment processes; 
- the capitalisation of production rights in asset values. 
TEconontic costs 
According to  numerous estimates,2  in the EU-12 about 30% of the 
income transfers flowing  from households to producers is likely to be lost 
in inefficient allocation of resources.  Moreover these estimates usually do 
not take into account: 
- the  administrative  costs  borne  by  national  and  local 
governments in the EC, of implementing policy programmes;  these 
are quite high, especially after the introduction of milk quotas and 
land set-aside measures which need detailed administration at farm 
level and careful monitoring; 
- the allocative and transaction costs of raising taxes in order to 
finance budget outlays, this cost has sometimes been estimated in 
15% of the tax revenue;3 
- the  cost born by  fanners  in  bureaucratic work  in  order to 
produce the documents necessary to administer the programmes of 
production quotas and land set-aside. 
These negative effects on resource allocation in agriculture, widely 
recognised in the  CAP-12 will apply  also to  CEEC-6 in CAP-21. The 
present levels of CAP price support are probably more related to the past 
and present strength of different farm lobbies than to sound motivations 
based on economic or social arguments. They would then be even less 
justifiable when applied to CEEC-6.  Moreover there is every reason to 
1 See Croci-Angelini 1994, p.427 
2 See for example European Commission DG-II (  1994, p. 91 ), Roningen, Dixit and 
Seeley (1989), de Veer (1989). 
3 Brown (1989) p. 53 
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counterparts in exerting upward pressure on prices. For instance, in Poland 
farm interest groups have already played an active role in raising the level 
of agricultural protection, and are closely linked to the Peasants Party of 
Prime Minister Pawlak. 
Table 4.3-1 Average size and total factor income of agricultural businesses 
in the EU in  1990-91 (EU) and 1992-93 (East German  ) 
Average size  Total factor Income 
per farm  per farm  per labour unit 
in hectares  in DM  in DM 
ast Germany 
Individual farms  140  113.472  57.894 
Partnership  444  499.548  97.835 
Coop./Capital Company  1786  1.807.178  32.746 
est Germany  26  46.336  29.726 
16  84.901  51.583 
34  64.175  54.119 
4  23.47  13.2 
15  19.574  16.825 
28  58.791  36.316 
26  24.418  20.303 
6  27.83  20.303 
uxembourg  32  62.785  38.277 
etherlands  16  109.141  52.383 
ortugal  7  7.904  4.979 
nited Kingdom  68  102.099  42.764 
ource: Bundesministerium  i.ir Emarung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 
Agrarbericht 1994 p. 41, 64, 65. 
Lessons from East Germany 
In Eastern Germany, where the CAP has been applied in the last four 
years, the impact on agricultural structures has been striking. Farm labour 
has declined from about 500,000 employed peoplel  in 1989 to 120,000 in 
1993. Livestock has dropped remarkably between 1989 and  1993: cattle 
from 5.7 million to  2.8 million units, pigs from  12 to 4  million, sheep 
from 2.6 million to 814 thousand units. Production has concentrated in the 
most profitable  crop production for  large farms,  cereals  in  particular, 
attracting  large investments. As a consequence of this dramatic response to 
1 The actual  figure  was  820  000 employees, of which  60%  were working in 
agricultural production and 40o/o  were working in  n1anagement and administraation, in 
cultural and social sectors and inseiVices. (fhiele H.  1994 Background paper) 
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has rocketed to the highest levels in the EU, and unemployment has risen 
dramatically, up to 17% in some regions (table 3.1-1). 
This reallocation of labour has been also a consequence of the high 
level of wages, however this experience of accession to the present CAP by 
East Germany is extremely interesting.  It indicates the possible impact of 
the CAP price support on the  agriculture of CEEC-6,  in  certain areas 
where the agricultural structure is comparable to that of East-Germany. 
Worse interregional allocation of  resources 
Production quotas and land set-aside are likely to be more strictly 
implemented in  CEEC-6 in order to  limit the  costs of export subsidies. 
However, paying farmers to keep land idle through a costly administrative 
structure  would  be  even  more  damaging  in  countries  who  are  still 
converting from a command economy towards a market oriented economy 
in order to use their economic resources more efficiently and to avoid the 
frustrating, inefficient and costly state bureaucracy. 
Since the new member countries will have very different patterns of 
comparative advantage within a EU of 21  countries, quotas and set aside 
policies, inhibiting interregional resource mobility, will have large negative 
consequences for economic efficiency, preventing the adjustment towards 
of a low-cost, internationally competitive European agriculture. 
As shown in the appendix, various studies suggest that, thanks to low 
labour costs, Poland continues to have a comparative advantage in labour-
intensive products which are subject to little or no processing. In contrast 
inefficiencies in food processing and distribution entail low competitiveness 
and difficulties in exporting dairy products and processed foodstuffs. These 
results should be  treated with caution, but they would seem to reflect the 
incomplete nature of transformation.  Applying production quotas in the 
CEECs during the transitional stage freezes existing production structures 
and risks protracting distortions indefinitely. 
In the longer run 
In the longer  term price support  and  quantitative  restrictions  are 
likely to hinder intersectoral and intrasectoral structural adjustment in the 
EU-21, generating further economic costs. As the supply of land is  rather 
rigid, the extra revenues transferred to fanners by price support tend to be 
capitalised in asset values.  This increases the cost of land to those wishing 
to expand or enter the industry, reducing the dynamic of the land market. 
Supporting  farm  prices  and  incomes  has  maintained  in  EU  -15 
agriculture a  larger share of workforce and an  inefficient farm  structure. 
The supply management policy measures, production quotas and land set 
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term adjustment process. 
Figure  4.3-1 Value added per A  WU vs. Assets per A  WU in the EU, year  1990/91 
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Figure 4.3-1  indicates  the  relation existing  in  the  EU  between the 
assets and the  Value Added per annual work unit (A WU) in  agriculture. 
Smaller farms tend to be labour intensive and will face increasing problems 
in  guaranteeing a 'fair standard of living to  the agricultural population'. 
However they do not create structural problems when managed on a part-
time,  as  a  hobby  or by  retired  people,  when  the  main  share  of the 
household income is provided by non-farm sources. 
Privatisation 
With the  exception  of Polandi, one  of the  legacies of the central 
planning system in Central and Eastern Europe was a favourable structure 
of the agricultural sector in the sense that on average the cooperative and 
state farms were relatively large. Privatisation has entailed dismembering 
these farms largely on the basis of political and social criteria, and at times 
this has meant that the  crucial economic question of "appropriate" farm 
dimension has been ignored. In Romania, Albania and the Baltic States, in 
1  In  Poland the private sector accounted for an  estimated 77% of the utilised 
agricultural land in 1985. 
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relatively small pieces of land, leading to widespread farm fragmentation  I. 
Many of the new owners who received land through restitution are not 
themselves fanners, and for the most part are unlikely to be  interested in 
taking up that occupation. This would leave open the options of selling or 
letting their land.  By  raising  land prices,  price  support measures and 
quantitative restrictions would hinder this process. 
Privatisation has a strong political element as a means of reducing the 
role of the state which, under the previous system, was widely considered 
too powerful and corrupt. It  can act as  a  powerful weapon in breaking 
down the tutelage relationships between state and enterprises, encouraging 
individual initiative, and creating a vested interest in the new order. 
Privatisation  is  usually justified on  efficiency grounds, though  its 
redistributive effects have been the subject of much debate, leading to the 
introduction of mass privatisation schemes in various CEECs, including the 
Czech Republic and Poland. These schemes involved giving vouchers which 
could  be  used  to  purchase  state-owned  enterprises  to  a  part  of the 
population. 
It  is,  however, essential to  point out that unless  flanked  by other 
measures such as  demonopolisation and trade liberalisation, privatisation 
alone may prove ineffective in raising efficiency. The risk is that inefficient 
state  monopolies  might  simply  be  replaced  by  private  monopolies  or 
oligopolies. 
4.3.2.  In the  rest of the economy 
lntersectora/ allocation 
International  competitiveness  is  likely  to  be  lower  also  in  non 
agricultural  industries.  Higher prices to fanners raise factor costs for 
all enterprises, whilst taxation to support agriculture has to be borne by the 
rest of the economy.  The development of non-fann related sectors in the 
economy is likely to be delayed. 
The  argument  for  price  support  based  on  the  need  to  avoid 
unemployment are, at most, valid only in the very short run and at a local 
level.  They apply to rural communities where alternative job opportunities 
are not immediately available. At national and at EU level the reduction of 
1 In  order to  avoid farm  fragmentation  some CEEC's (such  as  Hungary and  the 
Czech Republic) also  introduced alternative forms  of decollectivisation.  For instance, 
previous collective farms have been transformed into true cooperatives, or into joint stock 
or limited liability companies. In all countries some state fanns have been kept on in public 
ownership for purposes of research and experimentation. 
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is likely to increase economic activity and total employment. I 
Empl  oyn1e nt 
In  1992 the share of agriculture in  total employment in the CEECs 
was higher than the EU average, ranging from 6.5% in the Czech Republic 
to 27% in Poland and 32% in Romania 
There  is  much  uncertainty  concerning  the  effect  of transition  on 
employment.  Difficulties  arise  because  prior  to  1989  agricultural 
employment statistics included many non-agricultural activities, reflecting 
the  diverse  operations,  and  in  particular  services,  carried  out  by 
cooperative and state farms.  While transition is  likely to reduce hidden 
unemployment  and  contribute  to  the  shedding  of excess  labour  in 
agriculture,  in  some  cases  this  tendency  may be offset by  the  role  of 
agriculture as  a  shock  absorber,  soaking up  unemployment  in  times of 
recession. The latter development appears to  have prevailed in Romania 
and  Poland,  where  agricultural employment has  increased by  15% and 
0.5%  respectively  between  1989  and  19932.  In contrast  in  the  Czech 
Republic the number of people permanently employed in agriculture fell 
from 390,000 to  250,000 in 1992/3. 
However, in  all these countries there does appear to be a longer-term 
trend  towards  reduction  in  agricultural  labour  force  which  was  in 
operation even prior to  1989 (see Table 4.3-1) With the economic recovery 
of the CEECs, it seems likely that the  importance of agriculture will fall 
substantially as national income rises. 
The state of flux entailed by the transition process could be regarded 
as  an  opportunity  to  encourage  restructuring  and  bring  the  share  of 
agriculture  in  the  CEEC economies more  in  line  with  that of Western 
Europe. Such an opportunity could be jeopardised by the introduction of 
high levels of price support. 
Table 4.3-1: Percenta e of the economicall 
Bulgaria  zecho- omania 
slovakia 
1  75  26.5%  15.1%  1.7%  .7%  9.6% 
1980  18.1%  13.3%  18.2%  28.5%  30.5o/o 
1985  14.9%  11.1%  14.5%  24.4%  25.0% 
1990  12.2o/o  9.3%  11.5%  20.8  20.2 
1991  11.8%  9.0%  11.0%  20.1  19.4 
1 According to  some estimates, the  abolition of the  CAP would increase total 
employment by 1 million jobs (Stoeckel 1985) 
2 Jackson and Swinnen (1994), p.40 
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Production Yearbook 
Inflation 
Heavy  agricultural  spending  runs  contrary  to  the  aim  of 
macroeconomic stabilisation, and high levels of supported prices contribute 
directly to  inflation. This  is  particularly worrying  in  the CEECs where 
there is an acute need to combat inflation. 
Economic transformation creates  inflationary pressures through the 
reduction of producer and consumer subsidies, the liberalisation of prices, 
and devaluation. At the same time the collapse of the CMEA greatly added 
to energy prices in the CEECs. As a result, for instance, inflation was still 
over 20%  in  all  these  countries  in  1993,  and  was  as  high  as  60o/o  in 
Bulgaria and 354% in  Romania. However, inflation had been over 1000% 






DP  Unemployment  In  ation 
change per year  %  % 
-7.4  -14  -15  0.7  na  2.7  8.4  10  11.  42  161  310  354  2 
-9.1  -12  -7.7  -4.6  1.6  11.7  15.6  17  17  26  334  71  60  4 
-12  -9  1.5  4  6.1  11.5  13.6  15.7  1  588  70  43  35.3  3 
-3.5  -15  -8.3  -4.6  0.3  4.9  10.4  14.5  18  10  57.8  10.1  24  2 
-1.2  -14  -7.1  0  0.8  2.8  2.6  3.4  5  9.7  52  11.1  20  1 
ungary  -3.5  -12  -5  -1  1.6  7.5  12.3  12.1  1  28.4  35  23  21  2 
Note:  1993 data are provisional 1994 data are forecast. 
Source: OECD (1994b). 
4.3.3.  In the rest of the world 
International allocation 
At global level  the  negative effects of the CAP-15  in destabilising 
and  depressing world market prices will not be reduced, on the contrary 
they  could  increase  within  the  limits  allowed  by a more or less  strict 
implementation  of the  GATT commitments  taken  by  the  EU  and  by 
CEECs. 
Accession of the CEECs would increase the share of enlarged EU in 
world trade and with an unrefonned CAP this would worsen tensions with 
other agricultural  exporting  countries,  and  in  particular  the  US.  For 
instance, a simple static comparison shows that in  1992/3 EC (12) wheat 
I OECD 1994b 
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In the same year coarse grain exports were 8.6 million for the EC (12) and 
0.8 million for the CEEC's1•  If,  however, the  impact of higher support 
prices on CEEC production and consumption were also taken into account 
the effects would be far more substantial. 
Effects of  trade liberalisation on world prices 
There have been numerous studies attempting to estimate the effect the 
CAP on world agricultural prices. The results  obtained using different 
models are not directly compatible because of differences in base years, 
countries considered, sources of data, underlying assumptions, definitions 
and so on. Nonetheless, taken together they provide some indication of the 
direction and relative size of the changes in world price levels for different 
agricultural products as a result of total or partial CAP liberalisation. As 
shown in Table 4.3-2, the studies generally suggest that the greatest price 
increase would occur for dairy products, with large price increases also for 
beef and sheepmeat, sugar, wheat and coarse grains2. 
Various studies also show that agricultural trade liberalisation would 
also  reduce  the  instability  of world  prices.  For instance,  according  to 
Anderson and Tyres (1992) tariffication combined with a 50% reduction in 
industrial-country  protection  rates  would  reduce  the  coefficients  of 
variation of simulated international prices from 67% to 36% in the case of 
wheat; from 23% to 10% in  the case of dairy products; and from 27% to 
12% for ruminant wheat. 
Hamilton and Winters  (1992) have used a  modified version of the 
model developed by Tyres and Anderson to assess the consequences of the 
liberalisation of CEEC trade; a successful conclusion to the GA  'IT Round, 
and accession of the CEECs to the EU. The reference scenario assumes a 
situation of no liberalisation in the CEEC countries. The two authors stress 
that the actual numbers should be treated with caution, though they believe 
"the basic message robust". 
Assuming a  "conservative"  increase in  agricultural productivity of 
some 15% and an increase in GDP of 10% in the CEEC's, the two authors 
estimate that trade liberalisation of Central-East Europe in an unchanged 
world trade regime would lower the  world prices for wheat (  -5%  ), beef 
( -1) and pork (  -1 ).  In contrast there would be a  10% increase in world 
prices for dairy products. 
According  to  Hamilton  and  Winters,  the  combined  effect  of a 
successful GA  'IT Round and the liberalisation of CEEC trade would lead to 
1 OECD 1994b 
2 For a more detailed discussion of these models see Senior Nello (1991) 
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(  48%) and pork ( 10%) in comparison with the reference scenario. 
Table 4 3-2 Estimates of the effect of agricultura  trade liberalisation on world price  eve s 
unilateral  100%  CAP liberalisation 






Frohberg. Fischer and 
Parikh (1990) 
multilateral  100% 
wheat  coarse grains  ruminant meats  non-ruminant 
meats 
13%  16%  17%  1% 
19.1%  11.5%  13.5%  5.8% 
9.6%  19.7% (oats) 
14.3% 
(tmley) 
0.7%  2.9% (barley)  3.9% (beef).  4.0% (pork) 




hberalisation  by  all  industrialised  countries 
20.4%  15.1% (maize)  12.5% (beef 
and veal) 








UNCT AD (  1990)* 
SWOPSIM USDA* 
(1990)  31% (lamb)  18%(poultry 
) 
*As reported by C. Ford Runge m W. P. Avery (1993) 
Impact ofCEECs accession 
A third simulation considers the impact of integrating the liberalised 
CEECs  into  the  EU.  This  involves  making  the  extremely  restrictive 
assumption that  to  avoid bankrupting the  EC budget, the  combined net 
export volume of each commodity from CEECs and EU is the same as in 
the reference scenario, so that world prices remain constant. According to 
this scenario CEEC farmers would enjoy price increases of 41 % for wheat, 
16%  for  dairy  products,  85%  for beef and  32%  for  pork.  This  would 
induce  CEEC farmers  to  increase  their supply  by between 26%  (dairy 
products) and 78% (beef). As a result these countries would increase their 
export volumes (by between 15% and 85%, depending on the product), but 
consumption would  decrease  by  13%  for pork,  23%  for beef,  2%  for 
wheat, and would remain unchanged for dairy products. 
However, Hamilton and Winters failed to take adequate account of the 
loss of the ex-Soviet markets following  collapse  of the CMEA, which 
caused surpluses to accumulate on CEEC markets, and depressed prices of 
agricultural products. 
Consumption is  determined by long-run price and income elasticities 
of demand and by population growth, however in the case of economies in 
transition  it  is  essential  also  to  take  into  account  the  correction  of 
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unreliability of official statistics prior to 19892, consumption figures were 
generally  inflated by wastage.  For instance poor processing meant that 
households had to throw away large quantities of perishable goods (such as 
milk), while the way in which relative prices were fixed meant that bread 
and high quality cereals were widely used as animal feedstuffs. 
One of the  indicators  of living  standards  by  the  governments  of 
centrally planned countries was per capita meat consumption, leading to 
levels of consumption far higher than those found in countries with similar 
levels of income. According to the OECD3, the downward adjustment of 
meat consumption to levels more commensurate with income levels is one 
of the reasons for the harsher terms of trade for livestock producers. 
Overestimates 
It also seems likely that Hamilton and Winters underestimated the time 
-horizon necessary for the  15%  increase in productivity. Productivity has 
fallen  in the CEECs since 1989 as high input prices have led to greatly 
reduced use of fertilisers and plant protection4. Fragmentation of farms as 
a  result  of the  restitution  and  privatisation  processes  (or because  of 
difficulties in overcoming structural shortcomings in the case of Poland); 
uncertainties  regarding  property  rights;  liquidity  problems  and  high 
interest rates are likely to have protracted negative effects on productivity. 
In addition,  shortage of alternative employment opportunities  in many 
areas  means  that  the  phenomenon of underemployment on  farms  will 
probably also continue. As a result productivity improvements could take a 
longer time to show. 
It therefore seems likely that while Hamilton and Winters' results are 
robust with regard to the direction of change, the magnitudes would seem 
excessive, particularly in the case of prices and production. 
None the less, on the basis of the various studies it seems likely that the 
higher and more stable  world price levels  following  agricultural trade 
liberalisation would reduce, if not eliminate, the need for expensive price 
support policies in the CEECs. H the higher world agricultural prices were 
used as an opportunity to cut or at least limit price support measures, the 
negative  effects  of discouraging  consumption  or encouraging  surplus 
production could be offset. At the same time lower agricultural spending 
1 See Annex 
2 For instance meat consumption statistics often including bones, hooves and other 
waste products. 
3 OECD, (1994b). 
4 See Annex 
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would improve the budget situation of the  CEECs thereby contributing to 
the goal of macroeconomic stabilisation. 
4.4.  EFFECTS ON  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION 
4.4.1.  Intersectoral 
Intersectoral distribution of income is strongly affected by the CAP, 
as indicated in table 4.4-1. According to OECD estimates, an average, four 
member household  in  the  EU  in  1993  transferred over 1300 Ecu  to  the 
farm  sector.  This  benefited  every  Full-time  Farm  Equivalent  by  an 
average of 13100 ECU, or,  alternatively, every hectare of cultivated land 
by 830 ECU. 
These figures however do not give a complete image of the situation, 
as the  very numerous small fanners get only a minor share of the benefits, 
while  the  relatively few  large fanners  get  a much larger proportion. As 
acknowledged by the European Commission about 80% of the benefits goes 
to the 20% of the fanners, generally the better-off producers. 
Table 4 4-1 Transfers associated with agricultural policy  (Bn ECUs, average 1991-93) 





0.670  1.081  0.003  1.748 
0.989  7.87  0.113  8.746 
4.477  7.531  0.123  11.885 
48.913  198.226  1.694  245.445 
Finland  1.559  6.907  0.216  8.250 
~apan  15.807  165.022  41.369  139.460 
New Zealand  0. 0  81  0.086  0.001  0.166 
Norway  1.  715  4.145  0.184  5.676 
!Sweden  0.601  5.661  0.327  5.935 
!Switzerland  1. 934  10.318  1.601  10.651 
United  States  49.748  43.9  0.98  92.668 
ifurkey  3. 703  23.57  1.487  25.786 
lrotal  130.197  474.317  48.098  556.416 
Source OECD (1994a) ... 
In 1993  total transfers  to  agriculture  in  the  EU  was  328  ECU per 
capita.  The  population of the  four  Visegrad  countries  amounts  to  64.3 
million,  so  extending  transfers  on  the  same  per capita  scale  to  these 
countries would involve a total  outlay  of 21  billion EC.  The six  CEEC 
countries have a  population of 96.1  million,  so  the  same  simple,  static 
calculation would imply a total outlay of 32 billion ECU. If  the three Baltic 
States were also included, the total would rise to  34 billion ECU. There is 
not adequate data on full-time fanners equivalent for the CEECs to make a 
similar estimate, but given the  high share of the  active  labour force  in 
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likely to be even larger. 
High budgeta1y costs 
Although  in  the  present  conditions  of  rapid  transition  and 
restructuring in CEEC-6 it is not possible to estimate reliably their demand 
and supply  response  to  different  sets  of agricultural prices,  it is  quite 
apparent that if CEECs were granted the present EU level of agricultural 
price support  the budgetary costs would be very high. I 
1 Crucial to an understanding of the economic costs of the accession of the six CEEC 
nations is the fact that these countries possess an agricultural potential proportional to that 
of the whole Union. Costs would therefore rise comparably.  Several studies have recently 
confirmed this point.  Although there are wide differences amongst the various studies 
these are very much due to the particular assumptions individual authors make about the 
magnitude of  present disruption in these countries and  the rapidity and extent of their 
recovery.  All the studies, however, emphasize the large costs of CEEC accession to the 
EU. 
Estimates range from a very conservative 3. 7 bn  ecu to a record 40.5bn ecu for 
CEEC-4 accession.  The most cautious estimates (3.7 bn ecu), produced by Brenton and 
Gros from CEPS ( 1992), are based on  an extrapolation of EU  expenditure per unit of 
output on  levels of output in the CEEC as recorded in 1990 and without taking into account 
the recent changes in the CAP.  However, their estimate of the costs rises  to 23.4 bn when 
we allow the productivity of these countries to  reach the same levels as in  the EU.  A 
different study by Tangerman (1994) operates in the more appropriate framework of the 
post-reform CAP.  He estimates costs at  3.5 bn ecu.  The extension of set-aside and all 
other income support policies to  CEEC farmers, however, would immediately roughly 
double this estimate. Finally, a much higher estimate of the costs is proposed by Anderson 
and Tyers (1993).  They estimate accession costs at 40.5 bn ecu.  Their model  is possibly 
the most ambitious  as it considers the post-reform situation,  accounts for the necessary 
price and income support transfers and,  it also accounts for a possibly endogenously 
induced fall in world prices.  Over all, although the Anderson and Tyers estimates may 
appear quite distant from the rest of the results in the other studies, we have so far only 
considered CEEC-4 accession and made very conservative productivity estimates.  The 
studies above assume output to be back at 1989-90 level , by the year 2000.  However, it is 
quite reasonable to assume that even if agriculture in the CEEC does not recover rapidly, 
productivity will  be  catching up  with the EU  rather faster.  Further, all  these studies 
indicated that we must increase the estimates for the costs by 40-50% when considering 
CEEC-6. 
Thus , allowing the CEEC countries into the CAP would involve massive transfers 
from existing EU taxpayers and from CEEC consumers to CEEC farmers.  The costs  arise 
in several different ways. First, the price support system would stimulate their agricultural 
production with  considerable increases as  compared to  a  non  membership scenario. 
Second, to maintain EU  food  prices increased domestic  surpluses would have to  be 
exported to third countries, requiring large export subsidies.  This in turn will depress 
world prices thus further increasing expenditure over the whole EU budget.  Further, it will 
enhance trade tensions  between the EU and other states, thus inducing further economic as 
well as political costs to the process. 
However the  reform of the  CAP will  effectively facilitate  accession as it will 
moderately decrease the gap between EU and world prices, therefore reducing exports 
refunds.  A full implementation of the Uruguay GA TI Agreement would also  contribute 
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This seems likely to result in a mixture of reduced expenditure within 
existing  member states  and,  at  the  same  time,  in  an  increase  in  their 
contribution to  the budget.  On the  revenue  raising side  it  seem almost 
certain that tax increases or increases in national debt to pay for eastern 
Europe, would not be very popular.  This will be even more so since these 
payments would not  be  'one off' payments  related to  accession, but a 
continuing  requirement  in  order to  support  a  structurally  imbalanced 
situation.  On the cost cutting side, the EU expenditure consists mainly of 
support to fanners and to poor regions in general. Therefore any savings 
in  the budget will have a greater impact on the incomes of West Europe's 
fanners and/or poor regions. Given that both of these two groups are very 
powerful lobbies in the EU, it seems likely that the impact of an attempt to 
push forward  accession at  this  cost on the budget would bring about a 
coalition of EU farmers and poor countries which would block an eastern 
enlargement until the easterners were much richer, and/or depended much 
less on agriculture.• 
4. 4. 2.  Interpersonal  redistribution 
On the consun1er side 
Higher food  prices act as  a regressive tax on consumers and benefit 
those who have most to sell. This is of particular importance in the CEEC 
context given the high share of food expenditure in household budgets. For 
instance, according to Karp and Stefanou ( 1993 ),  the budget share of food 
rose from 35% for Czechoslovakia, and 39% for Poland prior to transition 
to 52% and 55-65% respectively in  1990. Subsequently the share of food 
spending has  tended  to  stabilise at  its  pre-1989  level  in  most CEEC's, 
continuing to rise only in Bulgaria and Romania2. 
However,  growing  income  disparities  during  transition have  been 
reflected in widening differences in  the share of income spent on food. 
Raising food  prices in  this context would exacerbate  income disparities, 
worsen hardship among the weaker elements of society and might even be 
politically and socially risky. 
On the producer side 
The distribution  of benefits  of price  support  among  producers  is 
largely proportional to the quantity produced by each fanner. It does not 
have much rationale as far as  the fann-type is concerned being mainly the 
result  of an  historical  process  of bargaining  among  EC  agricultural 
substantially  to  easing  the  enlargement,  pushing  the  accession  costs considerably 
downwards. 
I Baldwin, R.  (1994) . 
2 Jackson and Swinnen (1994), p.39 
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than an economic design by policymakers. 
tTable 3.4-1 Transfers per unit (Ecu) in 1993  I 
Per  Per  Per Ha 
person  FFE** 
~ustralia  51  2500  2 
l-\ us  tria  467  14500  1060 
~anada  221  14100  83 
EC-12*  328  13100  830 
Finland  599  20700  1200 
Japan  485  19800  11720 
New  Zealand  29  800  7 
Norway  686  33200  2900 
Sweden  199  20900  520 
Switzerland  715  25300  2470 
Un.  States  290  29600  170 
Turkey  189  1600  220 
OECD  avg.  326  12300  240 
Source:  OECD  1994a. p.l25  126. 
*Including ex-GDR. **Full-time farmer equivalent (FFE). 
***Excluding  Iceland 
From 
this  point  of 
view  the 
distribution 




under  the 
CAP-21 could 
be even worse 
than  that 
which  results 
from  decisions  taken  by  technocrats  in  a  command  economy.  There 
decisions could at least be consistent with some overall design or theory of 
economic development or of income distribution. 
4.4.3.  Interregional  redistribution 
Regions  benefit  in  proportion  to  the  support  granted  to  their farm 
products,  and  lose  in  proportion  to  their  demographic  size  i.e.  in 
proportion of the number to consumers. Consequently interregional income 
distribution is  not necessarily changed in  favour of the  less advantaged 
regions. As  an example, poor Mediterranean regions were disadvantaged 
by the  lower protection  granted  to  citrus  and  fruit  as  compared  with 
continental products. 
Analyses of the  regional  impact  of the  reformed  CAP are  not yet 
available, however estimates of the  regional  impact of pre-GA  TT price 
support are quite interesting. Table 4.4-2  shows the distribution of benefits 
from CAP price support among EC member countries and among Italian 
regions (weighted annual average 1984/85 and  1985/86). The benefit per 
Annual Work Unit in the mountainous Valle d'Aosta is estimated to be 44% 
of the Italian average, while, using the same measure, per capita benefit in 
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the  Netherlands  IS  estimated  to  be  4.5  times  higher  than  the  Italian 
average.1 
T  bl  4 4 2 R  .  al d'  'b  .  fbe  f"  f  .  a  e  - e~ ton  1stn  utton o  ne tts o  pnce support 
Regions  Farm sizE Ecu oer  ltalia  Ecu oer  ltalia  o/o  Final 
(ESU)  I  farm  =100  AWU  =100  •  productio n 
GERMANY(FR  34  17650  311 °/c  10051  289°/c  25% 
FRANCE  32.3  16722.  294°/c  10085  290°/c  30% 
UNITED KINGD )M  78  34386  605°/c  13179  378°/c  27% 
GREECE  8.3  3468  61°/c  1825  52°/c  23% 
BELGIDM-LUX.  41.4  19744  347°/c  11731  337°/c  25% 
DENMARK  37.5  16113  284°/c  14038  403°/c  19% 
IRLAND  14.4  9003  158°/c  7033  202°/c  32% 
NETIIERLANDS  70  29695  523°/c  15670  450o/c  22% 
ITALY  14.5  5682  100°/c  3483  1  00°/c  23% 
Valle d'Aosta  10.7  321S  57o/c  1539  44°/c  13°/c 
Pie monte  16.7  5649  99o/c  3054  88°/c  19°/c 
Lombardia  30.8  118871  209°/c  5555  159°/c  15%  - Trentino A.A.  15.1  5144  91°/c  3073  88°/c  19% 
Veneto  15.7  6368i  112°/c  3872  111o/c  22% 
Friuli Venezia G.  5570i  98°/c  3767  1  08°/c  20% 
Liguria  19.3  47811  84°/c  2771  80°/c  31% 
Emilia Romagna  25.2  87791  155°/c  4221  121o/c  21% 
Toscana  16.6  5898  1  04°/c  3129  90°/c  24% 
Marc he  9.4  4303:  76°/c  2722  78°/c  26% 
Umbria  13.5  6077  107o/c  3339  96°/c  26% 
Lazio  10.4  4188  74°/c  2857  82°/c  24% 
Abruzzo  7.5  3483  61°/c  2240  64°/c  26% 
Molise  15.4  7279:  128°/c  3635  1  04°/c  34% 
Campania  10.9  5118!  90°/c  2691  77o/c  32% 
Calabria  8.3  4169~  73o/c  3236  93°/c  32% 
Puglia  12  5867!  1  03°/c  4841  139o/c  35% 
Basilicata  9.2  4166i  73°/c  2722  78°/c  25% 
Sicilia  10.5  3639!  64°/c  3157  91°/c  29% 
Sardegna  15.8  43201  76°/c  2740  79°/c  16% 
Data source:  C. Brown, 1989. 
The  regional  dimension  tends  to  be  given  insufficient  attention  in 
analyses of the CEECs. With transition regional disparities have widened 
substantially,  in  particular  because  growth  of the  new  private  sector 
("organic privatisation") with the employment opportunities it offers tends 
to be concentrated in certain areas. 
Traditionally the  central-planning system compensated for regional 
differences through the bonus system, and by paying different procurement 
prices  to  farmers  in  different  regions2.  As  a  result,  in  the  absence  of 
compensatory measures, those regions which received extra support under 
1 Brown, C.  1989 
2 Jackson and Swinnen (1994), p.46 
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of adjustment. 
4.4.4.  Functional  redistribution 
The functional  distribution of income,  its  effectiveness  in  steering 
·resources to their highest value uses, is worsened because of the long term 
effects of price  support.  Extra profits  generated,  in  the  short term, by 
price support and quotas are gradually incorporated in asset values. This 
raises the value of capital rather than labour.  Those who own most assets 
benefit to the greatest degree.  In Eastern Germany after implementation of  I 
CAP, land prices have increased by 45%.  New entrants are forced to pay 
more for  land  and  the  other equipment needed  to  farm.  Those,  who, 
because they are more efficient, wish to expand find that the costs of doing 
so are increased. 
4.5.  EFFECTS ON  ENVIRONMENT 
Pollun·on in CEECs 
The present level of pollution  in CEEC-6 is sometimes reported to be 
quite  high.  "In  Czechoslovakia,  for  instance,  most  toxic  wastes  are 
improperly  stored.  In  N  orthem  Bohemia,  most  arable  soil  has  been 
damaged by pollution and  rivers and underground waters are  so polluted 
that  many  cannot  support  life.  In  the  Ore  (Krusnehory)  Mountains, 
sulphur dioxide and other pollutants have killed off most animal life.  Food 
is often contaminated by cadmium, lead and mercury.  The use of industrial 
paints in  cooperatives has  led  to  PCB  contamination of milk and other 
agricultural products"  .1 
Higher prices, higher inputs 
Higher prices  make  it  rational  to  use  more  bought  in  factors  of 
production.  The  misuse  or overuse of some  of these  inputs  can  cause 
pollution.  If higher product prices are applied in CEEC countries, there is 
likely to  be an  increase  in  the  use  of these  inputs.  Several damaging 
consequences can occur for both the natural and the social environment. 
These are  debated  infrequently in the economic and political arena, but 
their  impact  on  social  welfare  could  be  very  high.  It  is  therefore 
worthwhile examining them in more detail. 
4.5.1.  Natural  environment 
Fertilisers: health hazards, eutrophication 
I  Pehe, 1990, pp. 4-5 
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Excessive  organic  and  inorganic  fertiliser  use  is  associated  with 
several hazards  to human health and  the  environment.  This may arise 
either because too many chemical fertilisers or too much farmyard manure 
is  applied to  the land or because, as  a consequence  of the  build up of 
organic material in  the  soil, cultivation results in the release of nitrogen 
into either surface or ground water systems.  Nitrate leaches slowly into the 
ground and surface waters, so current levels of nitrates in our water reflect 
leaching from some years before. 
The best known hazard to human heath from this source is the  "blue 
baby" syndrome which can sometimes prove fatal.  This is thought to occur 
when infants consume too much nitrate in  water used for bottle feeding. 
Fortunately, this condition is  rare.  Nitrates also concentrate in the sap of 
nitrophilic vegetables, such as  lettuce, at several times the concentration 
that the EU recommends for water, 50 mg nitrate per litre. However, many 
nitrophilic vegetables contain vitamin C,  which hinders the oxidation of 
nitrate to nitrite, the more dangerous compound. I 
There  are  other hazards  of excessive  fertiliser  use  which  are  well 
documented.  Excessive  fertilisation,  and  especially  fertilisation  with 
sewage, can lead to contamination of soils and ·waters with heavy metals. 
This is  a pernicious problem, both because the expense of monitoring for 
heavy metals may mean that their existence goes unnoticed and because 
there are no low-cost ways of correcting the damage when it has occurred. 
Nitrates  and  phosphates  encourage  eutrophication,  the  aggressive 
growth  in  surface  waters  of algae  and  other  plants.  Eutrophication 
narrows waterways, tangles boat propellers, damages banks, and consumes 
oxygen killing fish and other water organisms. "Many ponds and lakes are 
now so contaminated by nitrates and phosphates that the resulting excessive 
plant growth has killed off most of the normal animal species. "2 
Pesticides 
Subsidised crop production encourages excessive use of pesticides, 
fungicides and herbicides.  Applications may be made as a precaution even 
when the pests concerned are not present at critical levels in the crop.  Such 
biocides, if they are not absorbed by the target pests, can pollute water and 
disturb natural biological pest control mechanisms, killing animals which 
otherwise would be predators of target pests.3 
Biodiversity 
Crop  and  livestock  populations  have  become  more  genetically 
uniform,  reducing  biodiversity.  High  prices  have  encouraged  the 
I Addiscott et al., 1991, p.  1  0 
2 National Consumer Council, 1988, p. 56 
3  Marsh et al., 1991 p. 26 
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wetlands, to crop land.  Pesticides have then been used to substitute for the 
traditional  controls  against  predation.  Together  with  veterinary 
pharmaceuticals which control disease, this enables farmers to concentrate 
on a narrow range of high yielding varieties of plants and animals reducing 
genetic  diversity  among  farmed  species.  This  is  a  feature  of modem 
agriculture in both the EU and the CEECs.I 
The high level of return from  marginal  output guaranteed by  EU 
price  supports  has  encouraged  research  and  development  designed  to 
produce very high yielding plants and animals. This has enabled farmers to 
maximise income by concentrating on a few  highly productive species at 
the expense of others.  Such crop cultivars and livestock breeds with a high 
productivity respond well to the intensive use of fertilisers, pesticides and 
special feeds, so biodiversity of crops and livestock has been lost.  "Since 
the  1920s, Greece has lost 95%  of its  traditional,  locally adapted wheat 
varieties.  A single potato variety  (the  Bintje) covers nearly 80% of the 
land sown to  this  crop  in the  Netherlands.  The top four varieties cover 
71% of Britain's winter wheat acreage. 
The many varieties of almonds on which Spain based its production 
have been almost totally  replaced by a few  high-yielding varieties from 
California"  ...  "Valuable  genebank  collections  of  wild  species  and 
traditional  varieties  have  tended  to  be  under-utilised.  For example, 
researchers  have  shown  that  all  of France's  current  wheat  varieties are 
descendants of Noah, a variety developed in the Ukraine last century.  By 
crossing  a  few  well-known  genitors,  plant  breeding  programmes  have 
considerably  reduced  the  genetic  variability  of French  wheat cultivars 
grown today."2 
"Hundreds of Europe's hardiest breeds of chicken, geese, ducks, pigs, 
cows and other fam1  animals have also disappeared forever or are on the 
I  For centuries, European farmers tolerated, protected or sowed wild edible plants, 
nurturing biodiversity.  "Until fairly recent times, more than two thousand wild plants were 
eaten by the rural populations of Europe." "The art of informal breeding practised by rural 
people was such that crops and animals introduced from distant lands developed into a 
complex mosaic of uniquely adapted local varieties.  Each village had its particular tomato 
or wheat.  Each region had its particular breed of pig, chicken or cattle."  ... "In many cases 
farmers encouraged sustainability, stability and equity at the expense of productivity." 
(Pimben, 1993, p. 61-62) 
2 Pimbert, 1993, p. 63 
The EC has contributed to the narrowing of the genetic pool. After consultations 
with private seed companies, the EC established the Common Catalogue of varieties that 
could be sold on the market in  1980.  Farmers could no longer legally sell seeds and plant 
tissue from  unlisted varieties.  Agricultural land  use  was responsible for  85% of the 
declining numbers of plant species in The Federal Republic of Germany. (Sukopp, 1981, 
quoted in Haen, 1991, p.  14) 
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local  nitrogen  fixing  bacteria,  mycorhizae,  predators,  pollinators,  seed 
dispersers and other species that make up  the bulk of the biodiversity of 
traditional systems die out or become rarer.  Deprived of the flora  with 
which they co-evolved over centuries, these species become extinct or their 
genetic base becomes dramatically narrowed;  they can no longer provide 
the environmental services that contribute to the sustainability and stability 
of traditional  agroecosystems  such  as  soil  fertilisation,  pest  control, 
buffering against climate fluctuations, and crop pollination."  1 
uuulscape features 
The impact of specific policy measures on landscape features  of 
ecological  value  has  been  negative.  In  response  to  production 
incentives, farmers have brought sites with special ecological value, such as 
hedgerows  and  wetlands,  into  production.  In  one  area  surveyed  in 
northern Germany, two-thirds of the  hedgerows were destroyed between 
1954 and 1979. This land use conversion has led to the decline of hundreds 
of plant  and  animal  species.2  By  subsidising  production  the  EU,  in 
common with other agricultural policy makers, encouraged the destruction 
of such habitats, paying fanners to drain wetlands and consolidate fields by 
removing hedges.3 
The breaking up  of corridors of hedgerows and waterways, and the 
increased uniformity of cropping patterns have  destroyed the habitats of 
many species of wildlife. 4 "A heavily mechanised system of production and 
a high stocking density have caused soil compaction and the removal of 
hedges, as  well as  the extension of agricultural activity into areas which 
previously contained a wide variety of landscape features and an interesting 
flora  and  fauna."  5  Hedgerow  and  wetland  conversion  to  agricultural 
production have already occurred in many of the CEECs.  Large collective 
farms, using very large scale machinery had a major incentive to remove 
such features.  The application of the  CAP as  it  presently exists would 
probably reinforce this tendency after accession. 
Forests and woodland 
The environmental  benefits  of forests  and  woodland  have  been 
reduced. In the 12 EC member states in 1993, 57% of the land was devoted 
to  utilised  agricultural  area,  and  24%  to  woodlands.6  A  system of 
1  Pimbert, 1993, p. 64 
2  Haen et al., 1991 
3 Marsh et al.  1991, p. 30; National Consumer Council, 1988, p 63) 
4 Haen et al., 1991, pp. 14-15 
5 Thomas, 1991 
6  Commission of the European Communities, 1992, p. 36 
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Accompanying Measures  of the  MacSharry  proposals.  The  Forest and 
Woodland Accompanying Measure is laudable, but underfunded.  It cannot 
offset the effect of other policies which encourage fanners to use land for 
agriculture rather that for forests and woodland.  I  The EU has a surplus of 
cereals  and  must import forest  products.  However,  the  CAP supports 
cereal prices.  Cereal  price  supports  inflate  land  values,  so  that  UK. 
fanners, for example, realise  greater profits  by putting land into cereal 
production.  This  tends  to  raise  all land  prices  as  the  reduced area  of 
lowland grassland tends to push livestock production into more marginal 
areas.  Inflated land  prices tend to  make forestry  unprofitable both on 
lowlands which could support mixed hardwood forests  and on highlands 
which could support less valuable forests. 
4.5.2.  Social  environment, 
Fraud 
An ethically sound society is  a public good which can be enjoyed by 
everyone  and  benefits  producers  as  well  as  consumers,  consequently 
governments are usually committed to preserve and improve it. 
The  effects  of present  CAP  on  the  social  environment  are  less 
debated  in  the  literature.  In  the  short  term,  the  increase  in  public 
intervention, detailed regulations  and  bureaucracy at  the  local level are 
likely to  reduce the  existing entrepreneurial capacities and increase the 
propensity to fraud.2  Especially in  regions where the public administration 
is less efficient, opportunities for fraud and reduced transparency in market 
transactions have a remarkable negative impact on social welfare. 
According to  Klaus  Tiedemann, a German professor in  economic 
crime, the Common Agricultural Policy is  the greatest incentive to  crime 
among European policies today.  3 Export refunds and subsidy claims are a 
common source of fraud.  However,  in  many states EC fraud has been 
considered a crime less serious than robbery.  It often does not even attract 
criminal proceedings.  "The clear official message that fraud is  a  large-
scale problem costing billions of pounds is not put across to governments." 
4 
The CEEC is  likely to contribute to the costs of fraud and corruption 
resulting from  the  CAP.  For one thing, the  CEEC countries were no 
strangers to fraudulent practices prior to the transition to democratisation. 
1  Baldock and Beaufoy, 1992, p. 39. 
2 Currently fraud is estimated as accounting for 9% of the EU budget and are mainly 
concentrated in the CAP. 
3 Tutt, 1989,p. 100 
4 Tutt, 1989. p.  117 
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and Poland, and what you  see  (in the  Common Agricultural Policy) are 
patterns of fraud and cheating that are known from planned economies."  1 
Because CEEC governments are new, they have not yet developed clear 
networks of control, so they are likely to have limited success in preventing 
fraud.  Additional fraud will certainly be a cost of CEEC accession. 
Local, targeted progranmtes 
Price support is  not the best instrument to preserve rural values and 
culture.  One of the assets of the Union is the rich diversity of culture and 
traditions which exist within member states.  These give rise to differing 
values among member countries.  They also have different requirements if 
they are to be safeguarded.  Price support, however, operates uniformly 
over the whole of the Union.  Locally targeted programmes can be much 
more cost effective. 
Worse internan·onal relations 
At international level, the distortions of world market prices results in 
losses in  global welfare and affect particularly countries where agriculture 
represents an important source of export revenue.  They worsen diplomatic 
relations with trade partners who often retaliate, further deteriorating the 
international understanding and cooperation. 
Strengthening of  farm lobbies in the long run 
In the longer term, in  the  CEEC the  possibility that farmers may 
gain extra profits by  influencing domestic output prices will strengthen a 
network  of pressure  groups  similar  to  those  existing  in  the  EU.  The 
justification of these pressure groups lies in the need to defend farmers who 
are disadvantaged.  However when they succeed in becoming so powerful 
as  to  influence policy makers heavily, they  are likely to obtain sectoral 
benefits at a high social costs.  This has been the experience of the CAP. 
The strength of fann lobbies in the EU has threatened the development 
of the Union  in a number of cases.  Among the most recent was the Italian 
refusal  to  ratify  the  increase  in  the  EU  budget  ceiling  agreed  in  the 
December 1992 Edinburgh summit, unless it was let off a large part of the 
mandatory fines  imposed for exceeding  its  milk production quota.  In 
reprisal Spain said it would not ratify the planned EU entry next January of 
Austria, Finland and Sweden unless the budget was increased enabling it to 
secure a virtual doubling of its receipts from EU regional aid funds. 
The strength of the  agricultural lobby  in  various  CEECs has been 
reinforced by a new awareness of the importance of the farm vote. This 
1 Tutt, 1989, p.  101 
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agricultural sector in employment in the CEECs. 
Rent-seeking in CEECs 
Kornai  (1980,  1986)  has  described  "the  relation  between  the 
paternalistic state and firm which is  its  client" in the  former non-market 
economies, where the economic situation of a firm is largely determined by 
its capacity to bargain with authorities. Old habits die hard and the long 
experience of rent-seeking  activities  under central planning may prove 
useful in dealing with a Fortress Europe CAP. The process of privatisation 
in the CEECs is  incomplete, particularly in the food-processing industry 
and the production of farm inputs. There is a certain amount of continuity, 
particularly of personnel, between the centrally planned and transitional 
economy, and  so there may be a  risk  of a network allowing privileged 
access in lobbying activities remaining in place . 
. 4.6.  OVERALL APPRAISAL 
Degenerate policy 
While the objectives of the CAP are oriented toward the attainment of 
a higher welfare level of society as a whole, the actual implementation of 
this  policy,  deeply  unbalanced  in  favour  of price  support,  has  been 
strongly  oriented  towards  private  sectoral  interests.  According  to  the 
aforementioned Aristotelian classification of political systems, CAP was 
conceived as a "perfect" policy but has grown up as a "degenerate" one. 
The E U has suffered high costs in  terms of allocative efficiency, in 
administration  and  loss  of respect  for  the  policy  as  a  result  of fraud. 
Additionally  it  seems  to  have  failed  to  meet  social needs  to  raise  the 
incomes of the poorest fanners  whilst encouraging agricultural practices 
which have caused environmental damage.  Although the reforms of 1992 
have gone some way towards reducing the incentives provided by high 
prices, the CAP remains a product related policy, those who benefit most 
are those who produce most. 
Hinderfunher enlargement 
By delaying structural adjustment and protecting the EU against the 
third  countries,  existing  problems  are  not  solved  but  rendered  more 
difficult for the future. In principle the interests of new member countries 
will immediately turn against the enlargement to other European countries, 
as new accessions will mean extra budgetary and economic costs for the 
members of the Union. 
By adopting the "Fortress Europe" strategy, the broad economic and 
political horizons figured out by the European leaders in the Essen summit, 
i.e. a 27 member Union early next century, will be constantly hampered at 
any new enlargement negotiation by CAP problems. 
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neither their interests not those of the existing members of the EU. 
However,  if price  support  is  an  ineffective  means  of meeting  the 
policy goals of both the  candidate countries and existing members, it is 
necessary to  offer better solutions.  It is  not enough simply to dismantle 
arrangements which have resulted  in  economic loss, inappropriate asset 
values, high budgetary costs and a failure  to  satisfy either the social or 
environmental aspirations of the Community.  With that in mind that the 
next chapter of this report examines an alternative approach. 
5.  THE 'GLOBAL CONVERGENCE' STRATEGY 
Favour sn·uctural adjustment and fair remuneration of  externalities 
This strategy is based on the principle that governments should favour 
intersectoral  structural  adjustment  and  not  hinder it.  Farmers,  like  any 
other producer in  the EU, should be remunerated for every contribution to 
social welfare, and  in  proportion to  such  a contribution.  Production of 
goods or services sold on  the market should be equitably remunerated as 
should positive externalities and public goods which improve the quality of 
life or the environment. 
If this principle is  observed the present level of border protection and 
domestic  price  support would not be needed and  most of the  problems 
raised by the CEECs accession to the EU will be removed. Both EU-15 and 
CEEC-6  would  start  now  to  implement  a  set  of agricultural  policies 
consistent  with  the  GATT principles,  converging  not  only  between 
themselves but also towards international markets. This strategy would be 
fully consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Rome and the long term 
goals  repeatedly  declared  by the  EU  in  a number of international  fora 
including OECD and GATT. 
5.1.  GOALS 
An. 39, non distorted prices greater mobility of  resources 
In Article 39  of the  Treaty of Rome,  clause  '39b' 'ensuring a  fair 
standard of living to the agricultural population'  is stated as an objective 
for the policy to  be  reached  by means  of the  'increase of agricultural 
productivity .... and the optimal utilisation of the factors of production·' as 
stated in clause '39a'. 
For this to be the case market prices should regain their economic role 
as undistorted indicators of the social value of goods and services. Market 
price  manipulation  by  policymakers,  resulting  in  income  transfers  to 
specific groups of producers, should be limited to the short term and for 
stabilisation purposes. 
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production'  the  EU  should  engage  in  policy  measures  increasing  the 
intersectoral  and  intrasectoral  mobility  of resources  and  avoid  policy 
measures that hinder this mobility. The number of farmers in the country 
as  for  any  other  group  of workers,  should  take  account  of national 
economic, social and environmental objectives and not be maintained at 
artificially high levels"..  The costs of structural adjustment should not be 
born  by  farmers  alone,  but  shared  with  the  rest  of society  through 
appropriate policy measures. 
Remunerate (or tax) externalities and public goods 
Externalities and public goods, which are an important by-product of 
agriculture, should be identified and wherever possible internalised in the 
economic activity, preferably by means of calibrated payments or taxes. 
Such payments must be distinguished from  'support'.  Essentially they are 
the means by which society can buy the sort of public goods it desires, a 
payment for producing goods and services not a subsidy to retain resources 
in non-competitive uses.  Such public goods should be purchased at least 
cost.  In appropriate cases, for example, farmers  and other land owners, 
might be invited to bid for the benefits required, the  payment going to 
those who offered most at least cost. 
5.2.  INSTRUMENTS 
Measures  ~·vhich  will not  be required  reduction  under GATT  rules. 
The policy measures envisaged for the attainment of these goals are 
preferably those listed in Annex 2 of the GATT Agreement on Agriculture 
signed at  Marrakesh on  15  April  1994.  These are  popularly known as 
'green box' measures.  As a rule, they do not distort trade and do not affect 
the  level of  agricultural  production.  Consequently they  would not be 
subject to removal under the GATT commitments. 
Some of these policies are directed to  reducing the  risk of unstable 
markets ( public stockholding for food security, government participation 
in  insurance  programmes,  payments  for  relief from  natural  disasters). 
Others would be designed to promote economic development.  Structural 
adjustment  assistance  (producer  and  resource  retirement  programs, 
investment aids) would be co-ordinated  with  an  improved network of 
services  for  agriculture  (research,  training,  extension,  marketing, 
infrastructures),  with  rural  development  measures  (payments  under 
regional  assistance  programmes)  and  with  environmental  measures 
(payments under environmental programmes). 
Target-specific, transparent 
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I  ~ In  contrast  with  price  support,  these  instruments  are  not  product-
specific but can be targeted to  specific policy objectives and/or to specific 
local conditions. These features increase the possibility of monitoring their 
effectiveness and their costs and benefits for social groups as  well as for 
society as a whole. 
5.2.1.  Time  horizon 
Decoupling by y. 2000,  time limit at  2010 for compensation 
With reference to the future development of the CAP in completing its 
reform,  it  is  assumed that  by  year 2000 the  partial decoupling already 
implemented in the cereals and oilseed market regimes will be extended to 
all CAP market regimes. 
It is proposed that in preparation for the enlarged EU of 21, farm-gate 
prices should be  gradually  lowered  to  market clearing levels.  Through 
tariffs  agreed  in  GATT,  they  will  be  accorded  the  same  degree  of 
Community preference as  the average of non-agricultural products receive 
via the Common External Tariff.  Only as a safeguard measure, where it 
was  clear  that  price  fluctuations  threatened  to  damage  the  gradual 
restructuring process of agriculture, would border tariffs and subsidies be 
retained to stabilise domestic prices. 
A time limit (say year 2010) should be defined, when all  payments 
which have been introduced to compensate EU-15 farmers for the removal 
of the existing market price support, will be phased out. 
Con1pensation only for EU-15 
It should be made clear that these compensatory payments are fixed 
and apply only to present EU-15 farmers. They will not apply to any new 
acceding member state. Each new member country have to be  responsible 
for compensating its own farmers if its price support has to be reduced or 
removed at the moment of accession. This clear statement should prevent 
CEECs  from  seeking  to  exploit  any  leeway,  under  present  GATT 
commitments, to  increase domestic price support in the belief that, after 
accession, compensation would be  funded,  at  least partially, by the EU 
budget. 
5.2.2.  Marketable bonds 
Marketable bonds, pros and co1zs 
A system of marketable bonds would be introduced by year 2000 and 
gradually  implemented as  the  preferred option for  future  compensatory 
payments.  Bonds could be  issued  progressively taking  into account the 
existing farm  structure or type  of farms  within  regions, their rural and 
urban employment opportunities and  possible  local  environmental and 
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intrasectoral mobility of resources.  Compensation through bonds could be 
jointly financed by the EU and by national and local budgets. 
The 'marketable bonds' approach  offers several advantages compared 
to the present system of compensatory payments: 
a) Compensatory payments would be planned and computed as a 
lump  sum.  They  would  have  no  effect  upon  farmers  future 
production  decisions  once  the  reformed  CAP  price  levels  and 
amounts of compensation had been determined. 
b)  The  financial  burden  of CAP reform  on the  EU  budget 
would be spread over a definite number of years, while individual 
farmers  could realise  the  benefit to themselves at  any time.  This 
would create substantial liquidity permitting farmers to enlarge farm 
size, where this was a viable option, or, if that was not the case and 
the existing farm size is too small, enabling them to sell the farm and 
invest  the proceeds  either in some non-farm business activity, or in 
the  purchase of a  life  annuity  to  be added to  early-retirement or 
other pension benefits. 
This  increased  mobility  of financial  resources  is  likely  to 
stimulate the  intersectoral and  intrasectoral mobility of labour and 
land, so improving productivity both in agriculture itself and in the 
non-agricultural  sector, especially  in  the  rural areas  of backward 
regions where farm employment is  still too high and farm structures 
are least efficient.  By new investment in non agricultural enterprises 
unemployed resources could be activated. 
c) Administrative costs would be lower since the enumeration of 
crop  areas,  livestock  numbers  and  average  yields  needed  to 
determine  the  compensatory  payment  entitlements  of individual 
farmers  would need to  be carried out only once, instead of every 
year.  The  probability  of fraud  would  be  reduced  for  the  same 
reason due to the elimination of annual re-assessments of payment 
entitlements.  Because compensatory payments have to be negotiated 
only once, a  more finely  graduated modulation of compensations 
would be feasible. 
d)  Compensatory payments could be limited to a  period long 
enough to allow the majority of older fanners to retire and younger 
farmers either to restructure their farm  or leave farming altogether 
to take up another, more rewarding occupation. Some might wish to 
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time occupation.  Compensation would be guaranteed by the EU and 
would  not  depend  on  future  market  or  policy  developments, 
consequently the uncertainty for farmers about the amount of future 
compensatory payments would be eliminated. 
e) Movements to 'larger, economically viable' farms  does not 
necessarily  mean  more  agricultural  pollution.  Anti-pollution 
measures  and  a  better  financed  agri-environmental  action 
programme would enable socially desirable targets on environmental 
preservation and improvement to be attained at minimum social cost, 
without  steering agricultural  and  economic  development  in  rural 
areas in inappropriate directions. 
f)  Since  compensation,  paid  in  this  way  would  be  wholly 
decoupled from future  decisions  it  would be possible for differing 
levels of compensation to co-exist within the EU, additions to any 
funding  from  the  common  budget  being  made  from  national 
exchequers. 
g)  The  amounts  of compensatory  payments  could  also  be 
adjusted to take account of farm size.  If this were done the cost of 
reform  could  be  reduced  whilst  the  target  of a  more  equitable 
distribution  of  farm  income  could  be  more  readily  attained. 
Provided prices were  free  to  move such discrimination would not 
hinder the  longer term  agricultural  adjustment process towards  a 
more viable  farm  structure.  However,  in  view  of the significant 
differences in farm  structure which exist amongst member states of 
the EC, with some, such as  the UK  and the Netherlands, having a 
large  farm  size  compared  with  the  others,  it  would  create  a 
contentious flow of budget payments and receipts between member 
countries.  As a result, it may be difficult to reach agreed decisions 
about the modulation of compensation. 
h)  The cost to  the  EU  budget of marketable bonds depends 
upon political decisions.  In principle if the present amounts paid as 
compensation were used in this  way there would be no increase in 
annual budget  expenditure.  Farmers  who  wished  to  realise  the 
capital value of their bond would do  so by selling it  in the market. 
No additional calls would be  made on  the budget.  There would, 
however, be a considerable benefit in enabling the industry to plan its 
long tenn future and adjust to a more competitive environment. 
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a  freer market,  it  were  decided  to  increase  compensation several 
possibilities exist for moderating the impact on the EU budget. 
First,  there  would  be  a  removal  of existing  payments  for 
product price support which still amount to very substantial sums. 
Second, the compensation could take account of the  differing 
possibilities for adjustment relating to different sectors and differing 
regions.  Bonds  could  represent  varying  percentages  of the  lost 
revenues from price cuts in line with such considerations. 
Third, where member countries found the level of compensation 
available  from  EU  sources  to  be  too  small,  they  could  pay  for 
additional bonds, from their own budgets without resulting in unfair 
competition within the market of the Union. 
Fourth, it is quite clear that the long term budget consequence is 
that this form  of expenditure comes to an end with the  life of the 
bond. 
This  approach  would  actually  further  the  "policy  objective  which 
guarantees the competitiveness and efficiency of Community agriculture" 
as indicated by the Commission.  Farmers in  the CEECs will not receive 
compensatory payments for high prices they never had, but they will have 
the  opportunity to  realise  their production potential and  expand  in  fair 
competition within EU and international markets. 
If new entrants in the EU  intend to compensate their producers  prior 
to accession for a reduction in price support, they can implement a similar 
scheme  supported by  their national  budgets.  This  would  eliminate  the 
largest obstacle to European integration in agriculture. 
It is  very urgent that the EU should take this decision.  If it does not, 
the gradual increase of price support  within the CEECs may create serious 
budgetary problems should the  EU-21  find itself having to compensate, in 
addition to farmers presently in the Union, those now in the CEECs. 
5.3.  EFFECTS ON  EFFICIENCY 
Need for efficiency 
Among the  important reasons for price reduction is  the need for the 
Union to make most efficient use of its resources.  The economic efficiency 
of resource use is  not simply a matter of technical performance, such as 
yield, but of ensuring that the resource deployed has no lower value in any 
other use.  The result of price reduction is  not, as  is  sometimes assumed, 
that all the less productive land would be forced out of fanning, but that a 
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new pattern of use would emerge.  Changes would occur in both the more 
and the less favoured  areas~ 
Greater economic  efficiency  is  necessary  if real  incomes  are  to 
continue to grow within a relatively fixed framework of natural resources. 
For the CEECs it  is the key to penetrating markets, not only in agriculture 
but in other sectors of the economy as well.  For the EU it is the route by 
which  new,  higher  income  opportunities  can  emerge  for  all  those  in 
contracting industries, including farming.  The number of people currently 
unemployed  within  the  EU  is  roughly  double  the  number engaged  in 
farming,  so  the  importance  of efficient  resource  use  is  difficult  to 
overstate. 
Mobility of  resources 
The benefits of resource  re-allocation are  only  realised if resources 
displaced from one use are reabsorbed into new activities quickly.  Thus, if 
aid is to be given to a low income sector, the most effective instrument is to 
encourage activities  which make the  resources used of greater value in 
alternative  occupations.  Such  investments  may  include  education, 
transport, electronic communication or the improvement of information so 
that locally based industries, such as the provision of environmental goods, 
crafts or tourism may develop to generate new income flows. 
Particularly  in  view  of the  high  share  of  agriculture  in  active 
population or GDP in most CEECs, it seems likely that the long run decline 
in agricultural employment in these countries will continue. Encouraging 
migration of labour from agriculture (and possibly early retirement) could 
permit  improvements  in  labour productivity  thereby  raising  per capita 
farm incomes. 
However, the speed with which labour can leave the agricultural sector 
depends  on  opportunities  for  alternative  employment.  The  adjustment 
process of the transition process has led to levels of unemployment as high 
as 15.7% in Poland, 14.5% in Slovakia and 12.1% in Hungary in 1993. The 
rapid  growth  of the  private  sector offers  opportunities  for  alternative 
employment but on  a  scale  which varies considerably between regions. 
There is an urgent need for policies which take more account of regional 
diversities in the CEECs. 
Rw·a/ developnzent 
Such policies should give high priority to rural development, and in 
particular  the  promotion  of  alternative  non-agricultural  activities. 
Appropriate areas could be identified for the development of tourism and 
leisure activities, forestry, the creation of national parks and so on. In this 
context promotion of the food industry, which is relatively labour-intensive 
and tends to be located in  rural  areas could play an important role. This 
would also further the objective of developing an efficient and competitive 
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required by Western markets. Joint ventures with Western firms could help 
speed  up  this  process,  and  Hungary  in  particular has  generally  had  a 
positive experience with such enterprises. 
The present state of flux in  agriculture and the overall economies of 
the CEECs induced by  transformation, and in particular the privatisation 
process,  offers  an  excellent  opportunity  for  the  pursuit  of structural 
objectives.  Credit  facilities  and  'land  banks  "I  could  facilitate  the 
amalgamation of small holdings. The transformation of collective farms 
into real cooperatives, and the encouragement of cooperation among the 
new small private farmers would enable better utilisation of existing assets. 
EU backing for such measures now might reduce the difficulties and cost of 
extending the CAP to the CEECs later. 
Farmers  in  CEECs  have  always  lagged  behind  those  in  Western  1 
Europe  in  the  introduction  of modern  technology,  and  the  gap  is  now  -
widening due to the adverse terms of trade between input and output prices 
faced by CEEC fanners. In order to resolve this situation the CEECs could 
adopt either investment subsidies or input subsidies, but the former would 
seem more appropriate. Investment subsidies tend to encourage adjustment 
and benefit more efficient farmers, while input subsidies give across-the-
board assistance to  all  farmers,  and  reduce  the  incentive for  structural 
change2. 
Debts and interest rate 
Many cooperative and state firms  in  the CEECs inherited "bad debts" 
from  the  previous  system.  These  were  the  result  of the  widespread 
operation of "soft  budget  constraints"3  which  meant  that  the  financial 
situation of firms was largely determined by their ability to negotiate with 
the central authorities.  The  problem of bad debts  in  the  CEECs hinders 
privatisation and restructuring, imposes a strain on the banking system, and 
limits the ability of firms to obtain future credits. 
Whereas under the central planning system interest rates were low if 
not zero, a tight monetary policy is  an intrinsic part of the macroeconomic 
stabilisation essential to economies in transition. Nominal interest rates tend 
to be high and, in the general situation of uncertainty, the newly privatised 
banks prefer lending to enterprises capable of repayment in the short run, 
such as retail traders, restaurants and bars. Given the difficulties of fanners 
and  firms  up- and downstream  in  the  extended  agricultural  sector in 
obtaining credit, there would seem a strong case for Western aid measures 
in this context. 
I See also the proposal of Nallet and van Stolk (1994) 
2 See Grosskopf et a1  ( 1993) for a more complete discussion of this issue. 
3 Kornai, 1980 
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The ·worst-off groups receive greater benefits 
Allowing domestic prices to fall closer to world market prices benefits 
consumers in proportion to  their expenditure on the protected agricultural 
products.  It is  important to  note that this is  not the same thing as  'food' 
expenditure. That involves considerable costs in processing and distribution 
so that the value of the farm  gate component may fall  well below 50% of 
consumer expenditure.  Those  for  whom  lower food  prices  are  most 
important are low income households, such as single parent and pensioners. 
In the long temt 
Even for these the gains are likely to be smaller, per household, than 
the losses of the  smallest farmers and much less than those of the larger 
farm businesses.  Here lower prices imply an  immediate loss of revenue. 
For some  there  may  be  an  immediate  element of compensation  as  for 
example feed or seed costs fall.  In time the costs of all inputs, not least of 
land itself, is likely to be lower.  Thus the total income lost is less than the 
reduction in gross revenue.  In the long term incomes will recover as some 
farmers  leave the  sector, or, more likely, as  their children choose not to 
enter, so  that a reduced  industry income has to be divided among fewer 
farmers. 
In the  rest of  the economy 
Some  of the  more  important  redistributive  effects  occur  among 
industries  which  supply farmers  and  which  are  first  stage processors or 
transporters  of their  goods.  Here  two  impacts  have  to  be taken  into 
account.  A smaller volume of output is  available to  process.  Faced by 
lower prices the rational farmer will use fewer purchased inputs.  In this 
case the impact of price cuts is  not very different from quota imposition. 
However, following price cuts there remains the possibility of expansion if 
the  industry succeeds in using resources more productively.  Quotas are 
designed to prevent such a possibility. 
Lowering agricultural and food prices will have a beneficial impact on 
the rate of inflation. This would be particularly important for the CEECs 
where the rate of inflation in the transition period tend to be very high. 
lnten·egional 
Price cuts will affect products to the extent to  which existing policy 
raises  their  prices  above  the  level  needed  to  supply  the  market. 
Considerable variations exist between, for example fruit  and vegetables, 
pigs and poultry and milk.  Since these products are produced in different 
proportions in the several regions of the community there is  a prima facie 
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of regional income. 
International 
Lower prices will also impact on the distribution of income between 
member countries.  Those which are  net importers will gain, those  who 
benefit from  support  for  net exports  will  lose.  Before  too  simplistic 
conclusions are drawn, however, it is  important to recognise that, in so far 
as  lower prices  are  accompanied  by  compensation  payments from  the 
budget, countries and individuals will have to net any gains on their food 
bill against any increase in taxation paid to the Community. 
5.5.  EFFECTS ON  ENVIRONMENT 
Increasing demand for environmental goods 
The importance of environmental considerations in  both the CEECs 
and  the  EU  has  increased  in  recent  years.  This  is  partly  because  of 
increased recognition of the damage which may result from the interaction 
of economic  forces  and  technology  to  both  the  natural  and  the  social 
environment.  It is  also because as  people enjoy higher real incomes they 
tend to travel more and regard the countryside as a recreational asset.  Both 
these demands have been reflected  in  past agricultural policies but they 
have often been entangled in the complex mix of goals which those policies 
seek to satisfy. 
Promoting positive externalities 
The 'global convergence' approach envisages a different starting point. 
It recognises the social value of traditional agricultural products, whether 
food  or  industrial  raw  materials.  It  argues  that  farmers  should  be 
rewarded  for  these  at  their  social  value.  However,  where  the  market 
cannot reward values  which  are  important  to  the  community,  including 
many of the  environmental concerns  expressed  above,  it  is  proper for 
policy to pay those who produce these benefits directly.  In many cases this 
will mean paying fanners but it need not always do so. 
Discouraging negative externalities 
The other side of this coin is  that  where economic activity imposes 
social losses on a community, those who undertake it should be made fully 
aware of the  costs  involved.  In  principle this  might be  done  through 
systems of taxation such as  have been applied to  the  use of nitrogen in 
Denmark.  In  practice  it  may  be  more  straight  forward  to  rely  on 
regulations, such as those which apply to Nitrogen Vulnerable Zones in the 
UK. 
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Such concepts are reasonably clear but their application is extremely 
complex.  We do not have generally accepted ways of measuring the costs 
and benefits of either the natural or the  social environment.  We do have 
extremely articulate pressure groups which draw frequent attention to some 
particular concerns  in this  area.  The  policy  maker has  to reach some 
judgement, amid the cacophony of competing advice about what the public 
interest may be. I 
Subsidia1ity approach in implementation 
For some purposes it  is helpful to divide environmental concerns into 
those which are general to an  enlarged Community as  a whole and those 
which relate to specific local situations.  In the former category are issues 
such as global warming, the loss of biodiversity and the pollution of ground 
waters.  In the second may be the preservation of particular landscapes, of 
some remote rural communities or a wish to sustain a particular habitat.  If 
this distinction is  accepted it  seems that the role of the Community in the 
second case may be to empower local groups, at the nation state or below, 
to  take action whilst ensuring that  appropriate  measures  are  in  place in 
relation  to  the  first  category.  Such  an  approach  is  consistent with the 
notions of subsidiarity agreed at the Maastricht conference which set up the 
European Union. 
In detail the extent of environmental problems varies greatly across 
the area of the EU  21.  In some of the  CEEC countries the most pressing 
problems  result  from  industrial  pollution  of farm  land.  In most  the 
traumatic disturbance  of life  represented by  the end  of communism has 
resulted in acute social stresses as unemployment has increased.  Among the 
existing  members  of the  EU  there  are  sharp  differences  between  the 
problems of the South, in Greece, Italy and Spain and those of intensively 
farmed  areas  in  the  Netherlands or Denmark.  The ability  to  cope with 
these problems also varies.  It is most acute where unemployment is high, 
incomes are low and the problems most severe.  On this basis some flow of 
funds  from  richer to  poorer members  of the  Union may be justified in 
support of policies which fall within the category of subsidiarity. 
Non distorting measures 
1 As an example of succesful agro-environmental policy, in 1986, President Suharto 
of Indonesia banned  57  brands of pesticides, twenty  of which  had  previously been 
subsidized.  Farmers learned Integrated Pest Management (IPM)  techniques.  Three 
planting seasons afterward, the FAO reported a 90% reduction in pesticide uses and an 
average per hectare yield increase from 6.1  to 7.4 tons of rice per hectare. (Panayatou, 
1993, p.  65) 
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that  such  activities  should  not  result  in  artificial  or distorting  aids  to 
production within the Community.  This does not mean that products which 
are produced as a by-product of keeping the landscape attractive, sheep and 
lambs for example, are a distortion.  They simply form  part of the total 
supply and provided prices are free to respond, the overall use of resources 
within the EU can still be optimised. 
5.6.  OVERALL APPRAISAL 
Beneficial effects 
The Global Convergence strategy points a  route  which enables the 
CEECs to have a firm basis upon which to plan their agriculture which will 
make the agricultural consequences of enlargement beneficial rather than 
damaging to the EU-21.  It also implies a continuing process of adjustment 
to lower prices among the existing members of the EU.  The implications 
· of this are that there will be a gain in the efficiency with which resources 
are used and  an  improvement of the  situation of the EU  in relation to 
further moves towards trade liberalisation which must be expected in the 
next round of world trade talks. 
Losers pushed to restructuring 
The impact on the distribution of income depends upon the extent to 
which fanners are  compensated for lower prices within the existing EU 
countries.  If this were complete there would be a redistribution in favour 
of consumers funded largely by taxpayers.  Even within this scenario there 
would be losers amongst those who currently depend on agriculture, the 
supply traders, first stage processors and hired workers.  To an important 
extent these losses parallel those which have occurred elsewhere in society 
as industries have restructured.  Their social consequences must be a matter 
of concern for all members of society and it  is  primarily through social 
security provisions that the worst cases of hardship must be assisted. 
Public suppon to restructuring 
However, the Global Convergence approach does not leave the matter 
there.  It  envisages new job opportunities emerging as  owners of rural 
resources  respond to  environmental opportunities and as  rural regional 
policies play a  more vigorous part in stimulating growth in these areas. 
Most of all, these problems will be eased if the economy of the EU-21  is 
buoyant and con1petitive.  Avoidance of the temptation to trap resources in 
the declining agricultural sector at cost to the rest of the economy will itself 
play a part in enabling such an optimistic outcome to be attained. 
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During the period before accession, agricultural trade concessions can 
play a  crucial role  in facilitating  adjustment and preparing the  way for 
tighter links  between the  EU  and  CEECs.  Most  of the  concessions  in 
agricultural trade  between the  EU  and  CEECs are  now  covered by the 
Association or Europe Agreements. 
Because  of its  sensitive nature,  and  the  mechanisms  of the  CAP, 
agricultural  trade  was  considered  separately  in  these  Agreements.  In 
general the concessions were less favourable than in other sectors1. They 
cover a  ten-year period and  were  to  be "asymmetric"  in favour of the 
CEECs.  The  trade  provisions  came  into  operation  through  "Interim 
Agreements" which entered into force from 1992 for Poland and Hungary, 
May 1993 for Romania, December 1993  for Bulgaria and from January 
1994 for the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
ln1port  tariff quotas 
In most cases the agricultural trade arrangements of these Agreements 
fix  a quota, rising in time, of EU  imports of various agricultural products 
from the CEECs on which import levies and tariffs are gradually reduced. 
The concessions were granted on products imported in substantial quantities 
by the EC from the CEECs during a reference period. For most countries 
the three years  1988-90 were taken as  reference period2.  Average imports 
during the reference period were taken as the basic quantity for calculating 
quotas. 
In general the concessions entailed a 10% increase in quota each year 
for the  first  5 years,  with  a levy  or tariff reduction of -20%,  -40%  and 
-60% in the first three years, subsequently frozen. 
Tariff and  levy  concessions granted previously,  in  particular those 
under GSP  (General  System  of Preferences)  arrangements  were  to  be 
consolidated3. GSP treatment entails tariff or levy reductions (of as much 
1  For a  more  complete discussion  of the  agricultural  arrangements of these 
Agreements see Tracy ed. (1994). 
2 An embargo on food exports in 1990 meant that a two-year period from 1988-9 was 
considered more appropriate for Romania, while later negotiations meant a reference period 
of 1989-91 for Bulgaria. 
3 As Tracy (1994) pp.4-5 explains, in late 1989 the EC wanted to extend agricultural 
trade concessions to  Poland and  Hungary, without being compelled to extend these 
concessions to other exporters under the MFN treatment envisaged by the GATI. GSP 
treatment, which had hitherto been granted to developing countries (and Romania), offered 
a way of limiting concessions to the CEECs in question. As the GSP list included mainly 
tropical and sub-tropical products, it was necessary to add certain agricultural products of 
particular interest to Hungary and Poland to these lists. However under pressure from EC 
producers,  the  final  GSP  concessions  are  generally  less  generous  than  the  EC 
Commission's original  proposals.  In  particular,  a  number of products of particular 
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agricultural products. However, the existence of seasonal restrictions and 
supplementary levies at times limits the effect of these concessions. 
The Agreements envisage the  use  of safeguard measures following 
consultations between the two parties concerned if imports cause serious 
disturbance to markets. 
The Association Agreements were signed before the· GATT Uruguay 
Round was concluded, but they stipulated that any reduction in tariffs as a 
result of a  GATT agreement  would  reduce  the  rate  of duty  on which 
concessions under the  Europe  Agreement  were  calculated.  The Europe 
Agreements also provided for the examination "on a regular basis in the 
Association  Council,  product  by product and  on  an  orderly  reciprocal 
basis, the possibilities of giving each other further concessions".!. 
T  bl  6 1 1  EU  .  I  al  d  (MECU)  a  e  - agncu tur  tra  e 
Exports  to  Imports  from  Balance 
1990 1991  1992 1993 1990 1991  1992 1993 1990 1991  1992 
Poland  615  996  924  973 11 06  1080  952  723 -4 91  -8 4  -2 8 
Hungary  1 1 9  152  225  299  713  920  830  624 -5 94 -768 -6 0 5 
ex-CSFR  149  267  418  467  213  247  277  230  -64  20  141 
Romania  300  243  324  296  41  76  78  72  259  167  246 
Bulgaria  83  155  125  195  152  192  184  157  -69  -3 7  -59 
Total  1266 1813 2016 2230 2226 2515 2321  1806 -9 6 0 -702 -3 0 5 
Source:  COM(94)  361  final  page  21 
Criticisn1 
The agricultural provisions of the  Europe  Agreements have come in 
for  severe  criticism,  especially  with  the  transformation  of  an  EU 
agricultural trade deficit into a surplus in  1993 (as shown in Table 6.1-1 ), 
and it  is  frequently maintained that the  "asymmetry" was in the opposite 
direction from that  intended, namely in  favour of the EU. The criticisms 
include the following: 
1)  In principle  the  concessions  should  apply  to  all  agricultural 
products  exported  to  the  EU  in  significant  quantities  during  the  base 
period, but in practice the coverage was not complete, with estimates of 
coverage ranging from 67%  for Hungary to  79% for Bulgaria including 
importance to Hungary and Poland were included in the 1989 list, but not that of 1990 (see 
Senior Nello, 1991 ). 
I This quotation is taken from the Polish Agreement 







424 wine.I  The pattern of trade during the base period reflected the legacy of 
the state-trading system and the upheavals of the transition period rather 
than any longer term comparative advantage. 
2) The EU continued to apply export restitutions on its agricultural 
exports to the CEECs, in a situation where domestic CEEC products were 
already having difficulties in competing. 
3) The Association Agreements failed  to  remove  many barriers on 
trade. In particular, the EU continued to apply minimum .import prices on 
imports of soft fruit,  which were of particular importance to Poland, and 
in 1992 and 1993 this measure was used to suspend Polish imports. Exports 
of sheep and  sheepmeat were  covered by "Voluntary  Export Restraint" 
agreements, while imports of beef and calves were covered by the balance 
sheet procedure whereby each year the quantity of imports is determined 
by requirements, calculated on the basis of trade and production data.2 
4)  Various  aspects  of health  regulations  and  standards  were  not 
covered by the Agreements. In April 1993  the EU suspended imports of 
cattle, pigs and meat from the CEECs following an outbreak of foot and 
mouth disease in ex-Yugoslavia. The EU  maintained that health controls 
between these countries and the former Yugoslavia were inadequate. 
5) The EU  regulations for issuing quotas require that licenses up until 
the quota level are granted to firms based in the EU with at least one year's 
experience  in  trading  that  product.  Early  evidence  suggests  that  EU 
enterprises are in a strong position to  capture much of the economic rent 
arising from preferences3. 
6) The extent to which quotas have been taken up varies considerably. 
While some quotas have  been exceeded by large margins  (for example 
duckmeat for  the  Vise  grad  countries), others  were  not filled  (for some 
80% of products in the case of Poland)4 
However, when criticising the Association Agreements, the climate in 
which  they  were  negotiated  has  to  be  recalled.  Negotiation  of the 
Agreements  temporarily  broke  down  on  the  issue  of agriculture  in 
September 1991. This was ostensibly due to protests on the part of French 
fanners, but fanners in other EU countries, such as Denmark, Ireland and 
the UK were equally opposed. Moreover, EU  producers maintain that in 
some  cases,  such  as  for  certain  types  of soft fruit  and  live  animals, 
increased imports from Central-East Europe have led to market disruption 
by depressing internal EU prices. 
I  Tracy (1994), p.lO. 
2 These mechanisms are described in some detail in the chapter by John Maddison in 
Tracy ed (1994) 
3 See House of Lords (1994) 
4 These examples are taken from the House of Lords Report (1994) 
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Since the Agreements were signed, EU policy towards the CEECs has 
altered. Under pressure from the CEECs, and with a certain reluctance, the 
EU agreed to include the objective of eventual CEEC accession to the EU 
in the  preamble of the  Agreements.  It  was  only  subsequently,  at  the 
Copenhagen Summit, of June 1993, that the European Council announced a 
more definite  commitment  to  CEEC accession.  As  a  corollary  to  this 
change  in attitude,  it might be expected that further agricultural  trade 
concessions might be granted. 
According to  the  'Fortress Europe'  strategy, the  obstacles to such 
concessions  include  the  opposition  on  the  part  of EU  farmers  and 
agricultural pressure groups;  the  situation of overproduction in the EU, 
and the risk of market disruption in the case of certain sensitive products. 
According  to  the  'global convergence'  strategy,  the  arguments  in 
favour of further EU trade concessions to  the CEECs are that this would 
represent a powerful political message to these countries and could help to 
speed the process of adjustment. Improved possibilities of access to EU 
markets could also act as  a stimulus to improvements in quality of CEEC 
products 
Liberalisation  of  trade  on  a  sufficient  scale  would  strengthen 
competitive  forces  and  encourage  specialisation  and  an  international 
division of labour reflecting comparative advantage. To meet the risk of 
market disruption,  the  improved concessions  could be accompanied by 
safeguard  clauses  (provided  adequate  procedures  for  consultation  and 
forewarning are ensured) or by compensatory payments to EU fanners. 
Evaluation 
Tariff quotas do not perform well  in  terms of economic efficiency. 
The distribution of import licences and monitoring of their use implies 
considerable administrative work both by the public and private sectors. 
In terms of income distribution the results are little better. While these 
concessions  were  conceived  with  a  view  to assisting  the  CEECs,  the 
economic rent foregone by EU budget by lowering import tariffs is mostly 
appropriated by EU traders. 
Lobbying is often necessary to obtain the benefit of these rents,  and 
the process of obtaining licences may sometimes result in corruption. In 
this way the social environment is worsened. 
In principle quantitative measures should be avoided not only on the 
domestic market but also at  the border. Unconstrained tariff reduction is 
likely to perform better in terms of efficiency, equity and externalities. 
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flexibility in the use of quotas. This could involve substitution by similar 
products or allowing other CEECs to take up unfilled quotas1. 
Better  procedures  for  consultation  and  forewarning  before  the 
introduction of safeguard  measures,  or the  application  of barriers  for 
health  reasons  should  be  ensured.  There  should  also  be  increased 
cooperation  between  the  EU  and  CEECs  on  veterinary  matters  and 
standards. 
7.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A BETTER CAP-21 
7 .1.  UNBIASED  INFORMATION 
Con1plicated CAP, different direct interests 
The decision-making process in  sectoral policies may be described as 
the result of three main factors influencing the policymaker: his conscience, 
his understanding of the  preferences of his  constituency  and the  direct 
pressures received from  interest groups. The second and third factors  are 
however  interrelated  in  particular  when  sectoral  policies  are  too 
complicated for people at large to understand and when issues are explained 
on the mass media by experts more or less connected to interest groups.2 
As far as  agricultural policy is  concerned, consumers are usually less 
interested in the technicalities and effects of government intervention, in 
contrast with farmers who are deeply involved.  The media's presentation 
of news  generally  reflects  this  difference  of interest.  As  a  result, 
information at the regional and national levels is  frequently distorted in a 
number of ways.  For example the  member country's  interests  may be 
identified with those of its  own farmers.  In much of the European press 
agricultural  policy  problems  relating  to  the  impact  of price  support 
measures  on consumer welfare  receive  little  mention,  while  producer 
benefits  are  usually  widely  publicised.  The  result  is  either a  lack  of 
information or very distorted information amongst both farmers  and the 
general public on the actual impact of policy measures. 
Table 7.1-1  &2 Benefits from CAP and other opinions 
1 This is one of the various improvements proposed in the House of Lords Report 
(1994). 
2 Part of this paragraph is taken from Tarditi 1994b (unpublished paper) 
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survey  on  the  CAP  carried  out  by  Eurobarometer  (1988)1  on a 
representative sample of EC12 citizens (11651  interviews with people over 
15 years old). A large proportion of the people interviewed declared their 
complete ignorance of the CAP, however the opinions of the people who 
answered the questions are quite interesting. 
Table 7.1-1: Benefits from the Common Agricultural Policy 
B  DK D  GR  E  F  IRL I  L  NL  P  UK ECl,j 
'Public at large 
!Fanners have 
benefitted  43  58  30  56  9  38  66  40  47  44  43  34  34 
not benefited  23  26  48  25  59  31  10  24  27  34  27  38  37 
D.k./n.a.  34  16  22  19  33  31  24  36  25  22  30  28  29 
Total  100  100  100  100  101  100  100  100  99  100  100  100  100 
· Farmer's sample 
Fanners have 
benefited  49  81  11  59  7  29  78  37  55  85  41  59  36 
10t benefited  31  14  81  30  78  57  16  54  37  11  44  33  53 
ID.k./n.a.  21  5  8  11  16  14  6  10  8  5  15  8  12 
!Total  101  100  100  100  101  100  100  101  100  101  100  100  101 
!public at large 
tonsumers have 
~nefited  43  44  51  41  14  40  35  38  41  44  41  28  37 
.-.ot benefited  25  36  29  34  55  32  39  27  33  32  29  48  36 
p.k./n.a.  31  20  20  25  32  28  27  35  26  24  31  24  27 
!Total  99  100  100  100  101  100  101  100  100  100  101  100  100 
IF ann.ers Sample 
tonsumers have 
~nefited  57  76  63  50  17  49  58  49  60  72  41  63  47 
~ot benefited  26  13  29  31  62  34  27  34  27  16  40  28  37 
P.k./n.a.  17  11  8  19  22  18  15  17  13  12  20  9  17 
irotai  100  100  100  100  101  101  100  100  100  100  101  100  101 
Source: Europeans and their agriculture, Eurobarometer special issue, February 1988 
Although,  in  the  UK, the  CAP  increased  agricultural  support and 
changed from a deficiency payment scheme to  a system of market price 
support, shifting the burden from taxpayers to consumers, the majority of 
British farmers intetviewed think that consumers have benefited. The same 
I  Eurobarometer performs a monthly opinion survey on EU citizens on general 
political, economic and social issues, complemented by some surveys on special topics as 
the CAP. 
CAP-21,  9-12-94  66 .....-
' 
opinion  is  shared  by  over one  quarter of consumers.  In  Ireland  such 
percentages are equally alarming.  These opinions differ markedly from 
the results of the OECD study (Table 7.4-1) which estimated that transfers 
generated by CAP cost over 1300 Ecu/year per household, and benefit by 
over  13000  Ecu  the  average  full-time  farmer  equivalent,  or  benefit 
producers by  800 Ecu per ha. 
A large majority of EU -12 population and of fanners believe that the 
EU should  defend  its  position  as  the  second  largest world  agricultural 
exporter. A slightly smaller majority think they should not pay for CAP as 
consumer and as  taxpayers, not realising the inconsistency of this option 
with the defence of export leadership. 
Table 5.1-2 Opinions of EC citizens on the CAP 
CE12 B  OK  0  ~  E  F  IRL  I  L  NL  P  U< 
CAP budget as a whole is positive 
Farmers 
answers by general public  o/c 







Source: Eurobarometro 2-1988. (Translated from the Italian  ition) 
On the issue of the amount of public expenditure in agriculture (which 
used to account for over 50%  and  in  some years for almost two thirds of 
the EC budget)  answers from general public did not show a clear majority, 
while  among  farmers  59%1  thought  the  EC  budget  expenditure  was 
insufficient. 
This glimpse of how understanding about the CAP among EU fanners 
and consumers  diverges  from  reality,  on the  basis  of a  more  accurate 
analysis  of available  information,  is  quite  surprising.  Probably  more 
accurate information does not reach the general public because it is per se 
1 In this case the number of people who answerred the question is known to be 75%; 
consequently this opinion is expressed by 70% of farmers answering the question. 
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information is  a  prerequisite for  a  strategy towards  agricultural policies 
that would be more beneficial to society as a whole. 
Better information for CAP reform 
A radical reform of the  CAP will be feasible  only if the costs and 
benefits of the present political regime are discussed and confronted with 
better alternatives.  It is  important that the public should understand the 
implications of the opposed paradigms, here labelled 'Fortress Europe' and 
'Global Convergence'. if an informed decision is to be taken.  All political 
arenas and the mass media need to contribute to this understanding, both in 
the EU-15 and in the CEEC-6. This would reduce the 'political obstacles' 
which have often been  put  forward  by  EC  Ministers of Agriculture  in 
order to avoid lowering price support. 
In  1984  they  judged  that  a  12%  reduction  in  milk  prices  was 
'politically infeasible', and introduced the milk quotas notwithstanding the 
strong opposition of experts who foresaw most of the problems that milk 
quotas have created  I  especially in member countries with a large number 
of producers but poor administrative structures. Eight years later, the more 
radical reform of 1992, involving  30%  reduction in  the price of cereals 
and large budget outlays was approved, obviously overcoming the 'political 
infeasibility' thanks,  also,  to the  wider debate  on costs  and benefits of 
agricultural trade policies brought on the media by GATT negotiations. 
The  cause  of  the  insufficient  or  distorted  information  may  be 
attributed to  a  lack of balance between the  bargaining power of vested 
interests and the way in  which this affects the communication media.  A 
better system could be fostered by improving public information through 
the media directly,  and by  support for groups  representing wider social 
interests  (e.g.  consumers,  environmentalists).  This  could  act  as  a 
countervailing power in the cultural and political arena and contribute to a 
more adequate understanding of the public interest 
Poor & distorted information on CAP in CEECs 
In the CEEC-6 information on the effects of price support and on the 
role played by producers lobbies  in  demanding more protection is  very 
poor.  Recently price support increased both as a  political move toward 
integration with present CAP and as a countervailing measure against the 
negative effects on world markets of EU export subsidies. Whatever the 
motivation, these measures generate income transfers from consumers to 
1 See for example "The Siena Memorandum on  the  Reform  of the  Common 
Agricultural Policy" 1984. 
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domestic market prices and are not recorded as are budgetary transfers. 
In a suiVey of the opinions of consumers organisations I, when asked 
"what influence farmers organisations should have on policy making", the 
wide majority of answers was "larger". Only a tiny majority answered "as 
it is  now", or "lower". This is  a clear indication of how little is  known, 
even among the leaders and experts of consumer organisations, concerning 
the effects of agricultural policies and, apparently, of how information has 
been  distorted. 
PHARE contribution: Food Policy Network 
The  PHARE  could  make  a  great  contribution  to  the  future 
development of agricultural policies in CEEC-6 by assisting -public -interest 
groups  through a  'Food Policy  Network'  (FPN)  whose main objectives 
would be to systematically analyse and monitor the development of food 
and agricultural policies in  the new member countries. The FPN could be 
organised in four sections:-
- policy  analysis  (systematic  analysis  of current  food  and 
agricultural problems); 
- public relations (providing information and monitoring media 
output in order to counteract false or biased information); 
- ex  -ante policy monitoring (analysis of policy decisions before 
they are taken by national parliament or ministries, in order to assist, 
in a timely manner, the decision-making process and to safeguard the 
interests of society as a whole); 
- training  Uointly  organise training  courses and  initiatives at 
home and abroad for young people who may be expected take part in 
future in political decision making). 
7 .2.  REPRESENTATIVE DECISION-MAKING 
The 1966 intergovernmental conference 
The 1996 intergovernmental conference will be  the right occasion to 
improve the decision-making process in the EU  substantially. A detailed 
study of the interplay of lobbies and of the motivation that led to decisions 
1 This survey has been planned together with this study in cooperation with the 
Central & Eastern Europe section of the International Organisation of Consumers Union. 
Due to the strict time constraints, it is not yet completed. None the less the few results 
quoted in the text refer to the majority of questionnaires. The full results will be published 
separately, together with the results of a survey on farmers' organisations. 
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could be undertaken in order to avoid similar mistakes in the future. 
Present policy decisions for agriculture are taken largely by groups 
who have a direct interest in the industry.  Although governments may be 
said to have an overall concern for public welfare, their representatives in 
these  negotiations  are  generally  ministers  of agriculture  who  strongly 
represent the farming  interest.  Consumer interests are represented much 
less immediately.  Since the future of rural areas lies increasingly in non-
food  producing  activities  and  must  require  greater  attention  to 
environmental  and  regional  economic  issues,  the  balance  of interests 
represented amongst the policy makers needs to be reviewed. 
The approach considered here would ensure  that questions such as 
changes in  the level of social support for farmers  and farm  workers are 
examined within the framework of social policies as a whole.  Equally the 
interests of food consumers need to be considered in the wider context of 
competition laws, the use of standards and the protection of consumers.  In 
the same vein it is not sensible to separate the environmental concerns of 
agriculture  from  the  overall  environmental  challenges  facing  modem 
societies.  For these reasons the  segregation of agricultural policy into a 
separate forum, where its  technical complexities tend to prevent informed 
participation by other  interests is unsatisfactory. 
This  is  an  area where  more research is  urgently needed before the 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference and  the  further enlargement of the 
EU. 
Phare conn·ibution: institutions representing interests at stake 
Appropriate  studies  relating  to  the  CEECs  could be sponsored by 
PHARE in order to devise a more equitable decision-making process.  This 
would  involve  a  profound  reform  of existing  political  institutions.  In 
principle groups should be represented in the decision-making institutions 
in proportion to  the aggregate economic and social interests affected, not 
simply in  relation to  the  degree of interest of some individuals who are 
most involved.  This  would help to  guarantee  an equitable and  widely 
accepted outcome. A greater application of this common sense principle 
would profoundly change the  present institutional structure of the EU  -15 
and of CEEC-6. 
7 .3.  SECTORAL AND  LOCAL POLICY ANALYSES 
Systematic sector policy analyses 
The process of restructuring the CEEC agricultural, food processing 
and  distribution  industries  needs  substantial  financial  and  technical 
assistance  from  the  West.  Longer  term  concerns  such  as  improved 
intersectoral  and  intrasectoral  mobility  of resources,  in  particular  of 
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term structure of CAP-15 objectives and policy measures is  indispensable. 
It can provide recognised reference points for  the  CEECs  restructuring 
activity. In both the CEEC-6 and in the new  CAP-21, agricultural policy 
measures must be better targeted, implemented and monitored if they are to 
attain the desired results. Moreover sectoral policies should be consistent 
with overall social welfare objectives at EU, national and local level. 
Estimate of  interregional income transfers for planning 
Interregional  income  transfers  generated  by  the  agricultural  price 
support policy have been largely unplanned and often at  odds with the 
normal criteria for regional policies which seek to redistribute income in 
favour of poorer areas.  By targeting and monitoring the economic effects 
of agricultural  policy  measures,  including  the  structural  and  cohesion 
funds, it will be possible to monitor the financial and invisible transfers of 
income as  they  affect each region better. The overall policy of regional 
income redistribution,  which is  an  important  goal for  all  governments, 
could  therefore  be  better  planned  and  adjusted,  according  to  the 
preferences of EU-21  Policymakers.1 
PHARE conn·ibution 
A  proper network  of policy  analysts  would  take  years  to  develop. 
Long term assistance by PHARE would be timely and very useful for the 
CEEC-6. 
7 .4.  PROMOTION OF COMPETITION 
lmpelfect markets in CEECs 
The  process  of privatisation  has  proved  difficult  in  all  the  CEEC 
countries.  In part this stems from the absence of institutional structures and 
entrepreneurial attitudes  appropriate  to  a  market  economy  following  the 
collapse of the communist system.  In part it reflects the difficulties involved 
-in avoiding slipping from  state monopolies into private monopolies where 
most of the  people  who  have  the  necessary  technical knowledge  are  by 
training  bureaucrats  and  where  the  structures  which  exist  have  been 
conceived on a national scale. 
However, the logic of a market economy is that competition should be 
allowed to operate.  The founders of the EEC placed so much importance 
on this that they devoted sections of the Treaty of Rome to the "Rules of 
Competition".  In the agricultural sector these  rules  may  be challenged 
1 Between 1986·92 EC granted Ponugal $ 12 bn to modernise economy (EC foreign investments 
shifted from 9% to 25%). Between  1990·94 CEECs and Russia received$ from5.4 bn from  OECD and 
West Governments, $ 5.0 bn lending from  banks, in total $ 10.4 bn. less than these countries pay  for 
foreign debt. (Silvio Brucan, in The Times 21·10.94) 
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retailers or as a result of the operation of policy.  In the first case we can 
rely on the European Court to take action.  In the second the EU has given 
itself licence to  infringe the  rules  provided  its  policies  are  part of the 
common organisation of markets. 
In the EU-21  there is a need to be vigilant for both sources of market 
imperfection.  Technical characteristics, the development of Europe-wide 
brands and the efficiencies achieved by mass retailers mean that the food 
industry firms are likely to become larger.  At the same time the nature of 
consumer demand implies that a higher proportion of the consumer's Ecu 
is likely to be devoted to the value added of these industries rather than on 
that of the farm.  Whilst there is  a need to ensure that neither farmers nor 
consumers are disadvantaged by monopoly behaviour among processors or 
retailers,  it  is  important  not  to  frustrate  developments  in this  dynamic 
. sector. 
The proposal that farmers prices should not enjoy greater preference 
than  that  accorded  to  other EU  industries  is·  wholly  in  line  with  the 
intention of the  rules  of competition.  By removing the administrative 
barriers of quotas and other supply control devices, farmers are enabled to 
compete for a  share in  the  market on the  basis of the efficiency of the 
service they provide.  It is also probable that in such a market farmers will 
be encouraged both to join together to offer more attractive packages to the 
industries they supply and to enter into a variety of contracts which will 
make them better able to compete for market share. 
The  transition from  a  largely  command-style  economy  which has 
dominated most of agriculture in both the CEEC and the EU countries has 
resulted in a farming community used to depending on policies rather than 
markets for its prices and profits.  If the new enlarged agriculture of the 
EC-21 is to thrive, an important requirement will be to ensure that farmers 
are well-informed about the structures they will need if they are to prosper 
in this more competitive economic environment.  Whilst in the past the 
emphasis of extension has been on production and farm management, in the 
future a greater role may need to be accorded to marketing. 
PHARE contribution: monitoring competition 
A  contribution from PHARE to the organisation of an official body 
entitled to monitor factor and product markets together with existing policy 
measures could be the most effective way of preventing or dismantling any 
undesired growth of monopolistic or oligopolistic market conditions. 
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Fraud & ineffective controls 
Fraud and corruption are among the most obvious problems of state 
intervention  in  both the  CEECs  and  in  the  EU.  Fraud  is  estimated  as 
accounting for 10% of the EU  budget and is  mainly concentrated in the 
CAP. There is a special risk when policies are implemented by inefficient 
and ill-organised administrative structures. 
In  the EU administrative controls have been often implemented by 
organisations closely related to farmers, even though not directly elected by 
farmers within the region. It is not surprising, to find out that such controls 
have not always been as effective as  possible. In order to limit financial 
losses and the  deterioration of the  ethical environment in  rural areas,  it 
would be preferable for administrative controls to  be  carried out by the 
central EU administration.  Cases of fraud  which are detected should be 
widely publicised. 
PHARE contribution 
PHARE could promote a comparative study of existing organisations 
with similar functions at the state or Union level in order to devise the best 
structure to carry out such a delicate task in the CEEC-6. 
7.6.  RESEARCH  AND  DEVELOPMENT  ASSISTANCE 
R&D vs productivity 
In both the EU and the CEEC considerable strides have been made in 
research and development in agriculture since the Second World War.  One 
result of such progress has been to  increase massively the amount which 
can be produced from each hectare of land.  It has become fashionable in 
some parts of the  existing EU  to regard this  as  a misfortune which has 
undermined the CAP and given rise to the necessity for supply control.  As 
a result R &  D budgets, in  both industry and government establishments 
have been cut. 
This is a development which the enlarged EU  should avoid.  Greater 
productivity is the route to both sustainability and competitiveness.  It does 
not imply more production.  This will only occur, if prices are not allowed 
to move or if markets exist for the extra product at prices which cover its 
cost.  If there are  no markets, then resources  will be  released for other 
purposes.  In this  way  they add to  the  wealth of society but not to  the 
quantity of food produced. 
If such productivity-increasing research and development is prevented, 
no very  obvious change will be noticeable for some  years.  There is  an 
unused store of such ideas waiting to be applied and the rate of increase in 
yield may not slacken for some time.  However, ultimately, the farmers of 
the  enlarged  EU  will  have  fewer  tools  at  their  disposal  than  their 
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D effort.  Given the probability that EU-21  agriculture will face increased 
exposure  to  international  competition  following  the  next  world  trade 
negotiation,  the  neglect  of R  &  D  now  might  seriously  reduce  the 
opportunities for agricultural resources in the first and second decades of 
the next century. 
Benefit for consu1ners 
There is a further element to be taken into account.  In a competitive 
industry the benefits of innovation pass ultimately to the consumer in the 
form of lower costs, improved choices or both.  Where prices are fixed by 
administrative action this process is frustrated and what tends to result is 
surplus which has to be stored or exported.  The policies suggested here, 
where domestic farm  prices receive no  more support than other sectors, 
will avoid this problem.  Moreover, given the intention to move towards a 
situation of multilateral free  trade  in  farm  goods, one of the benefits of 
public R & D is that it will not be trapped by large international companies 
and exploited only for their private purposes. 
PHARE contribution 
Agricultural problems are often directly related to the local soil and 
climatic  conditions,  consequently  support  would  be  advisable  for  the 
extended  network  of research  institutes  which  exist  both  to  develop 
appropriate techniques and to assist the transfer of some aspects of western 
technology to economies in  transition. Through PHARE, EU -15  research 
and development assistance to CEEC-6 could be increased and provide a 
further substantial help to their economic development. 
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THE PRESENT  SITUATION  AND  OUTLOOK FOR  AGRICULTURE  IN 
THE CEEC'S 
The Present Situation of Agriculture  in  the CEECs 
The  early  years  of economic  transformation  of the  CEECs  were 
characterised by deep recession with  cumulative falls  in GNP of 20-25% 
and a  rise  in  unemployment to  12%  by  the  end of 1993.  However, the 
recession  was  probably  overstated,  partly  because  of the  notorious 
unreliability of official statistics (and  in  particular because not all of the 
growth in the private sector was recorded), but also because part of the fall 
in output was in firms previously characterised by negative value added. 
Table AI: Basic data 1993 
Land area  population  millions  Agriculture  as  %  Agriculture 
(000 sq.  km.)  GDP  as  % em_ployment 
Bulgaria  111  9  10.4%  17.4% 
Czech Rep.  79  10.3  5.5%  6.5% 
Slovakia  49  5,3  4.5%  10.3% 
Hungary  93  10.3  8.9%  8.1% 
Poland  313  38.5  6.5%  26.9% 
Romania  238  23.4  21%  32.2% 
EU  2363  345.4  3%  6.3% 
Sources: NFU briefin  28-9-1994,  g  p  .4 and EUROST AT 
Fall in agricultural production 
Table  A 1  illustrates  the  importance  of agriculture  in  the  CEEC 
economies, which  in  part  reflects  the  underdevelopment  of the  service 
sectors under the central planning system in  these countries. Agricultural 
production fell by some 3%  in  1991  and  14% in 1992 for the CEEC-101, 
but it appears that the decline is bottoming out, and positive growth rates 
are predicted for agriculture in most of the CEECs in 1994. 
The decline in production was particularly dramatic for livestock and 
meat production On the basis of OECD estimates, between 1990 and 1993 
total livestock production fell by 35.7% in Bulgaria, 38% in Hungary and 
21.8% in Poland. 
I Including also Albania and the Baltic States. 
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in 1993, which represents a fall of 43% compared with 1985 or of almost 
50%  compared  with  1981.  A  similar  reduction  was  experienced  in 
Hungarian pig numbers, which fell by 7% to 5,001,000 in 1993, a decline 
of almost 40%  compared with  1985.  Hungary's  cereal  production  was 
about 8.4 million tonnes in  19931, which was 13% less than in 1992, and 
almost 40% less than the 1986-90 average2. Wheat production fell by 12%, 
though the area sown rose by 17% to 992,000 hectares. 
Similarly in  Poland, agricultural production fell  by 2%  per year on 
average between 1989 and 1991, and by 13% in 1992. Sheep numbers were 
reduced by 57% over the same period, while beef production fell by 48% 
from 1.428m. tonnes in 1990 to 743,000 in 1993. 
Causes of  lower production 
The dramatic decline in  agricultural production was the consequence 
of a series of internal (to the agricultural sector) and external factors and in 
particular: 
i)  drought affecting most of the  CEEC countries in  1991  and  1992, 
and some countries also in 1993; 
ii) cuts in producer subsidies; 
iii) the worsening of the terms of trade between agricultural input and 
output prices; 
iv) the disruption caused by the privatisation process3; 
v) uncertainty with regard to the macroeconomic situation, changes in 
economic policy and the legal framework 
vi) financial difficulties and shortage of credit4 
vi) correction of distortions in  the  production structure arising from 
the previous central planning system. 
Adverse domestic terms of  trade 
Farmers  in  CEECs  have  been  faced  by  a  price  scissors  between 
producer  prices  for  agricultural  products  and  prices  of  inputs  and 
processed foodstuffs.  Producer prices have been depressed by the fall  in 
demand for agricultural produce in the  CEECs (see below), and by the 
emergence of surpluses on CEEC markets following the collapse of the ex-
Soviet export market. In some cases the situation has been exacerbated by 
an  increase  in  cheap  food  imports  from  the  ex  -Soviet  Republics  (e.g. 
Poland from the Ukraine). 
I According to data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
2 As reported in Agra Europe, 29 April 1994 
3 The issues of privatisation and demonopolisation are briefly discussed in Section 
4.3.1 of this Report 
4 This issue is discussed in Section 5.3 of this Report 
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In most of the CEECs privatisation of firms  producing farm  inputs is  far 
from complete, and there is evidence of these firms exercising monopoly 
power to raise prices. The CEEC's had long relied on cheap Soviet energy 
(which encouraged energy-intensive forms of production), but following 
the end of the CMEA, this· option was no longer available and world prices 
had to be paid. 
Reduced input use and yields 
As a result of this worsening of the terms of trade between input and 
output  prices,  CEEC farmers  reduced  the  use  of fertiliser,  herbicides, 
pesticides, and  machinery.  This was  reflected  in  much lower yields.  In 
Hungary  for  example  cereal  yields  fell  from  4.07t/ha  to  3.06t/ha. 
According to  official estimates, the  average application of nutrients was 
40kg/ha  compared  with  200kg/ha  in  the  past.  Similarly  in  the  Czech 
Republic the use of nutrients fell to  60 kg/ha and this was a major factor 
explaining a fall in  1992 cereal output by 1.2 million tonnes compared with 
19911  . It seems likely however that the decreased use  of chemical inputs 
will have a positive environmental effect. 
Much  of the  machinery  previously  used  on  the  large  state  and 
collective farms is unsuited to the small new holdings, and the way in which 
farm  assets have been  shared out under privatisation frequently  hinders 
their use  by  individual farmers.  The  beneficiaries of privatisation were 
often reluctant to  accept livestock in  settlement of claims, which was  a 
further factor contributing to the rapid fall in livestock numbers. 
According to official Polish statistics, farm  income in  1992 was only 
53%  of the  1989  level.2  It  is  estimated  that  only  30%  of all  farming 
households had incomes similar to or higher than the general population in 
1992, with the  remaining 70%  having a standard of living similar to the 
unemployed3. 
EU competition 
Prices for processed foodstuffs also rose rapidly in  the CEECs, with 
the result that many products were too expensive to be competitive on the 
EU market. This is partly because of the technology gap, and the high costs 
of producing foodstuffs  of a quality and standards required by  western 
markets4. Prices  were  also  raised  by  the  high cost of credit  (with for 
1 Stanek et al (1993) 
2  Report of the Polish Ministry of Agriculture and  Food, as described in  Agra 
Europe, East Europe, January 1994. 
3 This probably also reflects the role of Polish agriculture as shock absorber during 
the recession associated with the early years of transformation. 
4 Grosskopf et al (1993), p.12 
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between purchase of the agricultural raw materials and sale of the finished 
product.  Moreover,  as  in  the  case  of farm  inputs,  the  food  processing 
industry also appeared to be exercising monopoly power. 
CEEC producers  stress  that  a major factor explaining  the  greater 
competitiveness of Western, and in particular EU, products on the CEEC 
market and in third countries is the fact that such commodities benefit from 
export subsidies (and advertising) on a scale not possible for the CEECs. It 
also  seems probable  that  at  least  initially  liberalisation of CEEC trade 
caused an  overreaction on the part of CEEC consumers, convinced of the 
"inferior quality" of domestic products. 
The demand for foodstuffs in the CEEC's has fallen since 1989 due to 
reduced  subsidies,  lower  incomes,  and  greater  inequalities  in  income 
distribution. In Poland for instance, the fall  in demand between 1989 and 
. 1993 is estimated at 20%1.  However, the decline in CEEC consumption of 
foodstuffs indicated by the statistics is probably also overstated. In part this 
is due to the notorious unreliability of official statistics prior to 1989, but it 
is  also  because  consumption  figures  were  probably  inflated  by  the 
distortions of the previous system, and in particular by wastage.2 
The  outlook  for  CEEC agriculture 
It seems likely that in the medium to long tenn the production capacity 
of the CEEC's will increase more rapidly than demand thereby increasing 
the exportable surplus from the region. 
With  economic  recovery  (which  began  in  Poland  in  1993  and  is 
following  in  other CEECs),  higher  incomes  will  probably  raise  food 
consumption,  though  a  return  to  the  pre-1989  level  is  unlikely.  As 
mentioned above, wastage and  distortions in relative prices  "artificially" 
boosted food consumption statistics prior to transition. In addition the high 
share  of household  spending  on  food  in  part  reflected  the  fact  that 
alternative  products  on  which  to  spend  income  were  frequently  not 
available. Economic transition in the CEECs raised food prices through the 
elimination of consumer and producer subsidies, and this effect is likely to 
be  compounded  by  the  introduction  of price  support  policies  in  the 
CEEC's. What therefore seems likely to emerge after transition is demand 
1 Report of the Polish Ministry of Agriculture and  Food, as described in  Agra 
Europe, East Europe, January 1994. 
2 See also Section 3.4 of this report, which also discusses the question of share of 
food in household budgets. 
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expenditure on quality and processed products. 
Various  of the  factors  (such  as  drought,  or  the  elimination  of 
subsidies)  which  contributed to  the  dramatic  fall  in  CEEC agricultural 
production  were  of a  temporary  or one-off nature.  Other  aspects  of 
transition including the  fragmentation of farms as a result of privatisation, 
uncertainty regarding property rights and the high cost of credit could have 
more protracted negative  influence on production. The fall  in  livestock 
numbers  has  been  such that  the  breeding stock has  been considerably 
reduced.  However,  it  seems  probable  that  when  CEEC  farmers  have 
weathered  the  transition  process,  output  will  recover  in  response  to 
improvements in productivity and price increases. 
Causes of  productivity increase 
Various causes can be detected to explain productivity improvements!: 
better incentive structures as private initiative replaces state and collective 
farms; improved resource allocation with the re1J1oval  of central planning; 
improved technology; better availability of inputs and capital goods; more 
appropriate  feeding  practices;  better genetic  varieties  and  breeds,  and 
reduced waste and losses. 
The degree of disruption associated with the early stages of transition 
is such that it could take some time before the results of such productivity 
gains show. These eventual productivity gains could result in higher output, 
or could allow a reduction in the use of factors of production. 
The process of decollectivisation has been closely linked to that of 
restitution, or the settlement of historic claims on property. In the case of 
land, restitution may relate to the original property owned, or it may take 
the  form  of compensation  either  in  financial  terms  (Hungary),  or an 
equivalent amount of land elsewhere. The process of establishing property 
rights has been slow and complex leading to frequent disputes. This is  a 
major reason why, particularly in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia2, much 
land has been left idle3 .. 
Czech  experts4  have estimated that with the exception of malting 
barley, the area under cereals could shrink by as much as 50%  by the year 
2000 compared with the  pre-1989 situation. In particular, the area under 
I Tangennann (1993) 
2 OECD, (1994b) 
3 According to a report of the Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Food (as described 
in Agra Europe, East Europe, January  1994), 7%  of fann land in  Poland was also left 
fallow in 1992 . 
4 Stanek et al (1993) 
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potatoes by some 15-20 thousand hectares, while the substantially reduced 
cattle herds could reduce the area under fodder crops by as much as  100 
thousand hectares. In total this would mean setting aside some 150 thousand 
hectares of arable land. 
Impact on employment 
Transition  appears  to  be  having  a  dual  impact. on  agricultural 
employment: in many cases shedding of excess labour has been encouraged, 
but in others (notably Romania and Poland) agriculture has reverted to its 
traditional role as shock absorber for unemployment in times of recession1• 
However, it seems likely that with the economic recovery of the CEECs the 
long run decline in the share of the active population in agriculture in these 
countries will continue. 
The state of flux entailed by the transition process could be regarded 
as  an  opportunity  to  encourage  restructuring  and  bring  the  share  of 
agriculture  in  the  CEEC economies  more  in  line  with  that  of Western 
Europe. 
1 The issue of likely developments in employment is further discussed in Section 
4.3.2 of the Report. 
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